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Abstract
Essays in Environmental and Natural Resource Economics
and Econometrics
Ashwin Anil Rode
This dissertation is a collection of essays that contributes to the fields of
environmental and natural resource economics and econometrics. The role of
political economy factors in environmental and natural resource economics is a
common theme of the first two chapters. The third chapter is a contribution to
econometric methodology.
The first chapter deals with rent-seeking behavior with respect to environmen-
tal regulation. The allocation of costless permits during the establishment of an
emission permit trading program creates incentives for rent-seeking. I hypothesize
that firms with strong political connections have an advantage in rent-seeking,
which I model as a low rent- seeking cost in a contest for permits. Low rent-seeking
costs are predicted to yield a higher permit allocation for a firm in equilibrium.
This prediction is tested by exploiting an unusual feature of the U.K.’s allocation
procedure in Phase 1 of the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme for
carbon dioxide emissions. I observe both a firm’s actual permit allocation as well
as an earlier, provisional allocation that was rooted in technocratic projections
of future emissions but was never implemented. Firms had the opportunity to
vii
appeal their provisional allocation. I find that a firm’s financial connections to
members of the House of Commons strongly predict its post-appeal allocation.
Even after controlling for the provisional allocation, along with industry and
financial characteristics, a connection to an additional member is associated with a
significant increase in a firm’s actual permit allocation. Although no data exist on
the amount firms spent on rent-seeking, theoretical predictions on rent-dissipation
provide a basis for estimating these expenditures. The welfare loss from rent-
seeking is estimated to be at least 137 million euros, which represents a significant
cost over and above the abatement costs firms incurred to reduce their emissions.
In the second chapter, I investigate the “resource curse” hypothesis in the
context of a single country (the United States), focusing in particular on the
role of institutional differences across states in mitigating or amplifying the re-
source curse. I build on the work of Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) by explicitly
considering the interaction between a state’s natural resource wealth and its
institutional quality as measured by per capita corruption convictions. I find that
natural resource wealth is associated with lower economic growth only in relatively
corrupt states. In states with relatively little corruption, natural resource wealth
is actually associated with higher economic growth. These results suggest that the
institutional aspect of the resource curse hypothesis is relevant even in a developed
country context.
viii
The third chapter deals with the identification and estimation of treatment
effects under interference. The framework of potential outcomes has historically
assumed that the treatment status of other individual’s does not influence a given
individual’s outcome. However, many empirical settings are characterized by
“interference”, where an individual’s outcome depends both on own treatment and
the treatments of others. We extend the potential outcomes framework and define
treatment effects that are relevant in such settings. Treatment effects may involve
a comparison between outcomes when an individual’s treatment status changes
or when only the treatment statuses of others change. We propose necessary
conditions under which a full range of treatment effects are identified and show
how these effects can be estimated through a linear regression. Evidence from
simulations suggests that incorrect specification of the regression equation can
result is highly misleading estimates.
Professor Robert Deacon
Dissertation Committee Co-Chair
Professor Douglas Steigerwald
Dissertation Committee Co-Chair
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Chapter 1
Rent-seeking over Tradable
Emission Permits: Theory and
Evidence
1.1 Introduction
Market-based emission permit trading programs have become an important
part of environmental and climate change regulation worldwide. The aim of these
programs is to reduce emissions of a pollutant to the level specified by an emissions
cap in the most cost-effective way. While the emissions cap determines the total
number of permits in circulation, any emission permit trading program must also
specify a method for initially allocating those permits across the polluting entities.
The choice of initial allocation necessarily has distributional implications, and if
market imperfections are present it has efficiency implications as well (Joskow and
Schmalensee, 1998).
1
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There are two main approaches to initially allocating permits: auctioning and
grandfathering. Under auctioning, permits are sold to the highest bidder. In
contrast, grandfathering entails distribution of costless permits to emitters on
the basis of pre-determined characteristics. Grandfathering has by far been the
dominant allocation approach in practice, both because it can offset some of the
costs of emission reduction as well as for political reasons. Stavins (1998) points
out that allocating costless permits offers “a much greater degree of political
control over the distributional effects of environmental regulation” as compared
to auctioned permits. Fowlie (2010) notes that grandfathering offers “the ability
to make concessions to adversely impacted and politically powerful stakeholders”,
and that this ability has “been an important factor in the widespread adoption
of emissions trading programs”. While the Coase Theorem implies that a well-
functioning permit market achieves an economically efficient outcome regardless of
how permits are initially allocated (Coase, 1960; Montgomery, 1972), subsequent
work has shown that distributional and efficiency concerns cannot be decoupled if
the assumptions underlying the Coase Theorem fail to hold. For example, Hahn
(1984) and Stavins (1995) show, respectively, that initial allocations do matter for
efficiency if the permit market is imperfectly competitive or has transaction costs.
This paper draws attention to another source of distributional and efficiency
concerns in emission permit trading programs− rent-seeking behavior. Because
2
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permits represent valuable economic assets, a polluting firm stands to gain fi-
nancially if more permits are allocated to it. It is therefore plausible that a
firm will expend resources in lobbying to increase its allocation. Joskow and
Schmalensee (1998) argue that because decisions about permit allocations are
made by political institutions, these decisions are likely to reflect rent-seeking
behavior. Such behavior has been conjectured in the non-academic press.1 The
same idea has also been articulated more formally by Nordhaus (2006, 2007) and
has been theoretically modeled by Hanley and MacKenzie (2010). However, with
the notable exception of Joskow and Schmalensee’s (1998) study on the political
economy of the U.S. acid rain program, there has been little formal empirical
work exploring how rent-seeking behavior affects permit allocations when emission
permit trading programs are implemented.
I contribute to this literature by modeling a rent-seeking context in which
polluting firms can influence their permit allocations through lobbying, and then
test predictions of the model using unique data from Phase 1 of the European
Union’s (E.U.’s) Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) in the U.K.. Unlike the model
of Hanley and MacKenzie (2010), firms in my model face heterogeneous marginal
costs of lobbying. The differences in lobbying costs affect not only the amount
1See for example, “Soot, smoke and mirrors: Europe’s flagship environmental programme
is foundering” in The Economist, Nov. 16, 2006. See also, “Britain’s worst polluters set for
windfall of millions” in The Guardian, Sept. 12, 2008.
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of resources a firm devotes to lobbying but also whether or not a firm chooses
to pursue lobbying at all. The model generates predictions about the allocation
of the permit endowment among firms as well as the welfare loss from resources
wasted in rent-seeking.2 In particular, all else being equal, a firm’s equilibrium
permit allocation is decreasing in its marginal cost of lobbying, and the total
amount spent on rent-seeking by all firms is equal to the value of the rents.
The E.U. ETS gave away tradable carbon dioxide (CO2) emission permits to
nearly 12,000 industrial plants (known as “installations”) across Europe. Prior to
the beginning of the scheme in 2005, each member state was responsible for allo-
cating its national emissions cap to installations within its borders. My empirical
approach exploits an unusual feature of the permit allocation procedure in the
U.K. For the vast majority of installations in the U.K. (representing over 90% of
the national cap), I observe not only the actual number of permits allocated,
but also the number of permits the installation would have received under a
provisional allocation plan published one year prior to the final, realized allocation
plan. In the intervening year, firms could appeal their provisional allocations.
Because the national cap remained virtually identical in the two allocation plans,
efforts by firms to secure higher allocations for themselves took place in the
context of a zero-sum game. This setting provides a unique opportunity to study
2Since the initial work of Tullock (1967), the literature on rent-seeking has viewed rent-seeking
efforts as socially unproductive.
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the implications of rent-seeking behavior. While the provisional allocation plan
was based on technocratic forecasts of future emissions, the final plan reflected
lobbying activity during the appeal period (Mallard, 2009; Duggan, 2009). Due to
the structure of the allocation process, the appeal period in particular became the
locus of the lobbying activity related to allocations. The UK government explicitly
invited “consultation” regarding specific allocations only after the release of the
provisional allocation plan, and firms responded vigorously to this invitation. For
example, on a February day in 2004, thousands of executives filled an exhibition
center in Birmingham to question government officials on the recently published
provisional plan (Duggan, 2009).
As an empirical proxy for a firm’s cost of lobbying, I utilize data on the firm’s
pre-existing financial connections to members of the House of Commons. Although
members were not directly involved in the permit allocation process, a firm’s
connections to members are plausibly indicative of how easily it can exert influence
in diverse regulatory spheres. I find that a connection to an additional member
is associated with a significant increase in a firm’s realized permit allocation,
even after controlling for the firm’s provisional allocation, industry and other
characteristics. Although there exist no direct records of lobbying expenditures,
the theoretical results on rent-dissipation provide a basis for a calculation of how
much was spent on rent-seeking over permits in the U.K.. I estimate the welfare
5
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loss from rent-seeking in the U.K. alone to be at least 137 million euros. This is
a non-trivial amount when juxtaposed against available estimates of total annual
abatement costs, which are in the range of 450 million to 900 million euros for the
entire E.U. (Ellerman et al., 2010).
My work fits into multiple strands of literature. Most directly, I make a
theoretical and empirical contribution to the literature on the distributional and
efficiency properties of market-based environmental regulation. My work also
extends the theoretical literature on rent-seeking contests by considering a contest
where the cost of rent-seeking activity varies across firms, and is one the few exam-
ples where the predictions of a rent-seeking model are empirically tested.3 Finally,
my work contributes to an emerging empirical literature outside of environmental
economics on the benefits firms derive from political influence (Fisman, 2001;
Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Faccio et al., 2006; Jayachandran, 2006; Goldman et al.,
2010).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a model of
a rent-seeking contest for emission permits; Section 3 explains the institutional
details of permit allocation in the E.U. ETS; Section 4 describes the data sources
and contains empirical tests of the model’s predictions; Section 5 concludes.
3Although the rent-seeking literature has not explicitly analyzed the consequences of
heterogeneous rent-seeking costs across agents, it has considered contests in which agents have
different valuations of the contested prize (Hillman and Riley, 1989; Nti, 1999; Stein, 2002).
Certain findings from this line of work are echoed in my theoretical results.
6
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1.2 A Rent-Seeking Contest for Emission Per-
mits
1.2.1 Structure of the Context
Consider a competitive emission permit market with an emissions cap of A¯, in
which n firms are to participate. Although emission permits are allocated at no
cost, the realized allocations are influenced by the lobbying efforts of firms. The
contest for permits begins with the regulator announcing a provisional allocation
for each firm. The emissions cap constrains the regulator’s choice of allocations;
letting Ai ≥ 0 denote the provisional allocation for firm i, it is required that
∑n
i=1Ai = A¯. After the provisional allocations are announced, a portion of the
cap is reallocated based on firms’ lobbying efforts. Formally, let xi ≥ 0 denote the
lobbying effort of firm i and let A˜i denote firm i’s realized, post-contest allocation
of permits. The post-contest allocation of firm i is given by:
A˜i =

A1−γi +
(
xi∑n
j=1 xj
)
φ if
∑n
j=1 xj > 0
Ai otherwise
∀i = 1, 2, ..., n, (1.1)
7
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where φ ≡ ∑ni=1 [Ai − A1−γi ].4
The formula specified in (1.1) is purely redistributive in that the sum of the
post-contest allocations of all firms is the same as the sum of the provisional,
pre-contest allocations of all firms, both equalling the total cap A¯.5 The variable
φ expresses the number of permits subject to contest, and the number of permits
an individual firm captures in the contest is proportional to the ratio of its own
lobbying effort to the total lobbying efforts of all firms.6
The parameter γ ∈ [0,∞), which is common knowledge to the firms and
regulator, determines the value of φ. In particular, γ represents the extent to
which the regulator can be swayed by lobbying efforts. For instance, if γ =
0, lobbying has no influence on the regulator, and provisional allocations stand
unchanged.7 At the other extreme, as γ converges to∞, the provisional allocations
are completely overridden, and the realized allocations depend solely on relative
lobbying efforts.
4Equivalently, φ ≡ A¯−∑ni=1A1−γi .
5Unlike Hanley and MacKenzie (2010), I allow rent-seeking to influence only the allocation
of the cap, not the cap itself. In the case I study empirically, there is no evidence that lobbying
shifted the overall cap.
6This contest function dates back to Tullock (1980) and has been widely used since. For
example, Grossman (2001) uses it to model the formation of property rights; Hodler (2006) uses
it to model competition over natural resource wealth; and Hanley and MacKenzie (2010) use
it to model competition for costless pollution permits. Skaperdas (1996) argues that the class
of functions propounded by Tullock (1980), which is based on ratios of efforts, is the only class
that satisfies a number of desirable and plausible properties of a contest function.
7The provisional allocations also remain unchanged regardless of the value of γ if no firm
undertakes any lobbying.
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After allocations are realized according to (1.1), firms make decisions about
how much output to produce and how much of the pollutant to emit. Firm i
produces output according to a strictly concave, twice differentiable production
function qi(ei, zi), where ei denotes emissions and zi denotes a vector of other
inputs. Let p, τ , and η respectively denote the prices of output, emission permits,
and other factors. Let ωi denote firm i’s unit cost of lobbying effort. Firm i’s
profit maximization problem is
Max
ei,xi,zi
pqi(ei, zi)− ηzi − ωixi − τ(ei − A˜i), (1.2)
where A˜i is defined by (1).
The firm’s demand for emissions and other inputs to production are implicitly
defined by the first order conditions for an interior solution to this profit maximiza-
tion problem.8 Although the firm’s profits are increasing in its permit allocation,
it is straightforward to show that the firm’s optimal choice of emissions and
other inputs are independent of its permit allocation, and that in equilibrium the
marginal product of emissions will be equalized across all firms. These properties,
which accord with the textbook case of emission permit trading in a Coasian world,
8I assume that firms are price-takers. This assumption would clearly not be reasonable, for
example, in the extreme case where a single firm receives all the permits and behaves as a
monopolist. However, studies suggest that market power is not a major concern in the E.U.
ETS (Convery and Redmond, 2007; Hahn and Stavins, 2011).
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allow production decisions to be separated from lobbying decisions. Unlike in
models of imperfect competition (Hahn, 1984) or transaction costs (Stavins, 1995),
inefficiencies do not arise in this model due to a breakdown of the equimarginal
principal; instead efforts wasted in lobbying are the sole source of social losses.9
Hence firm i’s choice of lobbying effort can be isolated to the following maxi-
mization problem:
Max
xi≥0
τA˜i − ωixi, (1.3)
where firm i takes as given the lobbying efforts of other firms. Next, I solve for
the Nash equilibrium of such a contest with n firms.
1.2.2 Nash Equilibrium with n Firms
Differentiating (1.3) with respect to xi for i = 1, 2, ..., n, yields the following
first order conditions for an interior solution:
τφ x−i(xi+x−i)2 = ωi for i = 1, 2, ..., n , (1.4)
9The equimarginal condition will fail to hold if efforts devoted to lobbying somehow hampered
production. However, for the purposes of the model, I abstract away from this potential source
of inefficiency, focusing only on the efforts wasted in lobbying.
10
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where x−i refers to the sum of lobbying efforts of firms other than firm i. These
conditions state that each firm chooses a level of lobbying effort that equalizes its
marginal benefits and marginal cost.10
The first order conditions together with the non-negativity constraints on
lobbying efforts lead to the following best response functions:
xi =

√
τφx−i
ωi
− x−i if x−i ∈ (0, τφωi )
0 if x−i ≥ τφωi
for i = 1, 2 , ...n. (1.5)
A strategy profile in which all firms exert zero lobbying effort cannot constitute
a Nash equilibrium. According to the contest function specified in (1.1), the best
response of firm i to x−i = 0 is to exert an arbitrarily small amount of lobbying
effort, xi =  > 0, and thereby capture the entire quantity of contested permits.
However, this cannot constitute a Nash equilibrium either. Suppose for example
that x−i = 0 and xi =  > 0. Although firm i’s choice of an arbitrarily small
amount of lobbying effort, , is a best response to x−i = 0, the best response
function (1.5) indicates that the other (non-i) firms’ choices of zero lobbying effort
are not best responses to a sufficiently small . This reasoning implies that a Nash
equilibrium cannot involve only one firm with strictly positive effort while all other
10The second order sufficient conditions for a maximum are satisfied. The second derivatives
of each firm’s profit function are negative when evaluated at the interior optimum. Specifically,
−τφ 2xi(xi+x−i)2 < 0 for i = 1, . . . , n.
11
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firms refrain from lobbying. Thus at least two firms must exert strictly positive
lobbying effort in a Nash equilibrium. I now consider a strategy profile in which
all firms exert strictly positive lobbying effort.
All Firms Lobbying
If all n firms undertake strictly positive amounts of lobbying efforts, (1.4) will
hold with equality for i = 1, 2, ..., n. Summing both sides of (1.4) over all i and
rearranging, the total lobbying effort is:
x = (n− 1)τφ∑n
j=1 ωj
. (1.6)
If xi > 0 for i = 1, 2, ..., n, the best response function (1.5) implies
x =
√
τφx−i
ωi
for i = 1, 2, ..., n. (1.7)
Combining (1.6) and (1.7), I obtain
x−i =
ωiτφ(n− 1)2(∑n
j=1 ωj
)2 for i = 1, 2, ..., n. (1.8)
Consequently,
12
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xi =
τφ(n− 1)
(∑nj=1 ωj)2 ·
 n∑
j=1
ωj
− ωi(n− 1)
 for i = 1, 2, ..., n. (1.9)
Upon inspection of (1.9), it is evident that an equilibrium in which all firms
exert strictly positive lobbying effort is possible only in the case where ωi <
1
n−1
∑n
j=1 ωj for i = 1, 2, ..., n.11 This condition places limits on the dispersion of
the marginal costs of lobbying across firms.12 In the special case of n = 2 firms
the condition is guaranteed to hold, and the unique Nash equilibrium has both
firms lobbying. Moreover, the condition will also hold for any n if all firms face
equal lobbying costs. However, if firms face heterogenous lobbying costs, it is not
guaranteed that all firms will participate in lobbying. Specifically, those firms
whose lobbying costs are too high relative to those of other firms will choose to
refrain from lobbying.
Lobbying by a Subset of Firms
Uniqueness of Equilibrium
I now consider equilibria with k ≤ n lobbying firms and n − k non-lobbying
firms. Without loss of generality, let j = 1, 2, ..., k index the lobbying firms. For
11Based on (1.8), the condition ωi < 1n−1
∑n
j=1 ωj for i = 1, 2, ..., n is equivalent to x−i <
τφ
ωi
,
which is what the best response function (1.5) requires for an interior solution.
12In the case of n = 3 firms, the condition ωi < 1n−1
∑n
j=1 ωj for i = 1, 2, ..., n is tantamount
to the triangle inequality; the marginal lobbying cost of any firm must be strictly less than the
sum of the marginal lobbying costs of the other two firms.
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these k firms, the first order condition (1.4) holds with equality. Summing both
sides of (1.4) over i = 1, 2, ..., k and rearranging, the total lobbying effort is
x = (k − 1)τφ∑k
j=1 ωj
, (1.10)
and combining (1.10) with the best response function (1.5), the lobbying efforts
of individual firms are
xi =

τφ(k−1)
(
∑k
j=1 ωj)
2 ·
((∑k
j=1 ωj
)
− ωi(k − 1)
)
for i = 1, 2, ..., k
0 for i = k + 1, k + 2, ..., n.
(1.11)
A Nash equilibrium can involve k ≤ n lobbying firms if the lobbying costs of
these k firms are sufficiently close to each other, and the lobbying costs of the non-
lobbying firms are sufficiently higher than those of the lobbying firms. In particu-
lar, for (1.11) to be a Nash equilibrium, it is required that ωi < 1k−1
∑k
j=1 ωj for i =
1, 2, ..., k. Furthermore, the best response function (1.5) requires that x−i ≥
τφ
ωi
for i = k + 1, k + 2, ..., n. Noting that for the non-lobbying firms x−i = x,
this requirement can be expressed as ωi ≥ 1k−1
∑k
j=1 ωj for i = k + 1, k + 2, ..., n.
The requirements for a Nash equilibrium with k lobbying firms imply that the
k lobbying firms must be the k firms with the lowest lobbying costs. Also, because
14
Chapter 1. Rent-seeking over Tradable Emission Permits
ωi <
∑2
j=1 ωj for i = 1, 2 is trivially true, an equilibrium cannot involve fewer than
two lobbying firms. Lastly, it can be shown that the number of lobbying firms in
equilibrium is unique. (See Appendix A for proof that k is uniquely determined.)
The above results are summarized as the following proposition:
Proposition 1.1: Nash equilibrium of the n firm contest
1. Only the k firms with the lowest lobbying costs participate in lobbying, where
k ∈ {2, . . . , n} and is uniquely determined.
2. If firm i participates in lobbying, its lobbying cost must be strictly less than
the sum of the lobbying costs of the k lobbying firms, divided by k − 1.
3. If firm i does not participate in lobbying, its lobbying cost must be greater
than or equal to the sum of the lobbying costs of the k lobbying firms, divided
by k − 1.
4. The lobbying efforts of the participating firms are defined by (1.11).
Lobbying Efforts, Expenditures, and Permit Allocations in Equi-
librium
The equilibrium lobbying effort of a lobbying firm is decreasing in the firm’s
own cost of lobbying, however the effect of an increase in another firm’s lobbying
cost is ambiguous. (See Appendix A for proof.)
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Total expenditures on lobbying effort, which are obtained by summing the lob-
bying expenditures of all firms (i.e. ∑nj=1 ωjxj), are τφ(k − 1)
1− (k−1)∑kj=1 ω2j(∑k
j=1 ωj
)2
.
The following proposition establishes that when the number of lobbying firms
is arbitrarily large, rents are fully dissipated, a canonical result in rent-seeking
models.
Proposition 1.2: When the number of lobbying firms, k, is arbitrarily large,
total expenditures on lobbying effort equal the value of the rents, τφ.
Proof: For a given k, an upper bound on total lobbying expenditure is(
k−1
k
)
τφ. The upper bound is reached when the lobbying costs of the k lobbying
firms are equal; higher variance in the lobbying costs of the k firms leads to
lower total lobbying expenditure. This is because the quantity
∑k
j=1 ω
2
j(∑k
j=1 ωj
)2 is
monotonically increasing in the variance of the ωj’s and attains a minimum value
of 1
k
when the variance of the ωj’s is zero (i.e. when
∑k
j=1 ω
2
j
k
−
(∑k
j=1 ωj
)2
k2 = 0).
When the number of lobbying firms, k, is arbitrarily large, total lobbying
expenditures are equal to τφ. The reason for this is two-fold. First, the larger
the value of k, the more stringent are the limitations on the variance of the
lobbying costs. Specifically, when k is arbitrarily large, the conditions for a Nash
equilibrium imply that the variance of the lobbying costs of the k firms must be
zero. (Recall that, for any Nash equilibrium in which k firms lobby, it must be
that ωi < 1k−1
∑k
j=1 ωj for i = 1, 2, ..., k.) Second, as the variance of the lobbying
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costs of the k firms reaches zero, total lobbying expenditure must itself reach its
upper bound,
(
k−1
k
)
τφ. It is evident that this upper bound reaches τφ for an
arbitrarily large k. Q.E.D.
The Nash equilibrium implies the following post-contest allocations:
A˜i =

A
(1−γ)
i + φ
(
1− (k−1)ωi∑k
j=1 ωj
)
for i = 1, 2, ..., k
A
(1−γ)
i for i = k + 1, k + 2, ..., n.
(1.12)
Equation (1.12) forms the basis of the empirical work in Section 4. The
relationship between the provisional allocation, Ai, and the realized allocation,
A˜i, is specified by (1.12). Furthermore, for the lobbying firms, A˜i is decreasing in
own lobbying cost but increasing in the lobbying costs of other firms.13 Taking
the natural log of both sides of (1.12) yields
ln(A˜i) = (1− γ)ln(Ai) + ψi, (1.13)
where the quantity ψi equals zero for non-lobbying firms. For lobbying firms,
ψi > 0 and is decreasing in own lobbying cost but increasing in the lobbying
13The relevant derivatives with respect to own lobbying costs, for i = 1, 2, ..., k, are ∂A˜i∂ωi =
−φ(k−1)
[(∑k
j=1
ωj
)
−ωi
](∑k
j=1
ωj
)2 < 0.
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costs of other firms. In other words, a firm that can lobby at relatively low cost
(compared to other firms) will have a relatively high value of ψi and realize a
higher permit allocation.
The model implies an exact expression for ψi. Specifically
ψi = ln
(
A
(1−γ)
i + φ
(
1− (k − 1)ωi∑k
j=1 ωj
))
− ln(A(1−γ)i ).
However, a simpler approximation can be obtained. Using the fact that for any
small , ln(1+) is closely approximated by , ψi ≈
φ
(
1− (k−1)ωi∑k
j=1 ωj
)
A1−γi
.14 This suggests
that even if two firms face identical costs of lobbying, the firm with a higher
provisional allocation will have a lower value of ψ.15
After describing the institutional details of permit allocation in the E.U. ETS,
I test the predictions of the model, as expressed in (1.13), using data from
the U.K.’s allocation procedure in Phase 1. I am able to construct firm-level
provisional and realized allocations. While I cannot observe actual lobbying
effort or expenditures, I develop a proxy measure for a firm’s relative cost of
14This approximation is valid if the number of permits a firm gains in the contest (i.e.
φ
(
1− (k−1)ωi∑k
j=1
ωj
)
) is small relative to the permits the firm retains (i.e. A(1−γ)i ). The high
level of “persistence” of the provisional allocation (observed in the data) suggests that the
approximation is reasonable.
15I address this prediction of the model by including an interaction term between a firm’s
provisional allocation and a measure of its cost of lobbying. The inclusion of the interaction
term does not materially alter the results.
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lobbying using data on political connections. This allows me test whether firms
that arguably face lower costs of lobbying realize higher allocations, controlling
for their provisional allocations. Such a test will shed light on the distributional
consequences of rent-seeking for emission permits. As indicated in Proposition
1.2, the efficiency implications of rent-seeking depend centrally on the number of
contested permits, φ. The value of the contested permits is τφ, which is also the
total welfare loss associated with lobbying expenditures if k is sufficiently large.
By estimating γ it is possible to calculate a value for φ. The welfare loss can
then be assessed by multiplying φ by an expected permit price at the time the
allocation procedure took place.
1.3 Permit Allocation in the E.U. ETS
The EU ETS is divided into multi-year trading periods known as phases. Phase
1 spanned the years 2005-2007 and was intended to be a trial phase. Phase 2
spanned 2008-2012, and Phase 3 runs from 2013-2020. Permits from Phase 1 were
not valid for Phase 2. However, permits from Phase 2 could be banked to Phase
3 (Ellerman and Joskow, 2008).
For the first two phases, both the cap-setting and allocation processes of the
EU ETS were highly decentralized. Prior to each phase, every member state was
19
Chapter 1. Rent-seeking over Tradable Emission Permits
responsible for setting a national cap and developing a National Allocation Plan
that specifies the distribution of the cap to installations located in the state.16
Each installation was issued a fixed number of permits for every year within a
phase,17 and there was no restriction on banking or borrowing across years within
the same phase (Ellerman and Joskow, 2008). A permit confers the right to emit
one metric ton of CO2 in a given year.
1.3.1 Cap-Setting and Allocation to Sectors and Installa-
tions
The U.K.’s total cap was informed by its commitments under the European
Burden-Sharing Agreement of the Kyoto Protocol18 as well as its own, more
stringent, national emission reduction targets.19 The installations covered by the
16The cap-setting and allocation processes changed considerably in Phase 3. A more
centralized approach was adopted that did not involve National Allocation Plans. Also,
auctioning played a much bigger role. See European Commission (2013).
17It was up to the member states to determine which installations would be covered by the
ETS. Annex I of the EU Emissions Trading Directive defines the specific economic activities
that fall under the ETS regime. However, Ellerman et al. (2007) point out that “the
legal interpretation of which installations are captured by Annex I of the Directive differed
across Member States, in particular regarding the question of what constitutes a combustion
installation” (pg. 16).
18The Burden-Sharing Agreement allows the E.U. to distribute its Kyoto target among
member states. In June 1998, a political agreement was reached on the distribution of emission
reduction efforts within the E.U..
19The Burden-Sharing Agreement commits the U.K. to achieve a 12.5% reduction in CO2 and
other greenhouse gas emissions by 2012, relative to 1990 emissions. (Besides CO2, the Kyoto
Protocol covers 5 other gases: methane, nitrous oxide, sulfur hexafluoride, hydrofluorocarbons,
and perfluorocarbons (Grubb, 2003).) Beyond the Burden-Sharing Agreement commitments,
the U.K. has also set for itself more ambituous national targets specifically for CO2 emissions,
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E.U. ETS accounted for approximately half of UK CO2 emissions in 2002, and
the cap-setting was intended to ensure that the covered installations make an
“appropriate contribution” to the overall emission reduction goals (Department
of Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs, 2005).20
The U.K. Phase 1 National Allocation Plan was the first to be published
in provisional form (in January 2004) and influenced the plans of other member
states.21 All Phase 1 permits were distributed at no cost (Ellerman et al., 2007).22
Although the sector classifications changed drastically from the provisional to the
final plan, the two plans were guided by similar mechanical formulae. In both
plans, a small fraction of permits were set aside as a “New Entrant Reserve”.23
including a 20% reduction by 2010 and a 60% reduction by 2050, relative to 1990 levels.
(Ellerman et al., 2007)
20Transportation is the largest source of emissions that was completely outside the scope of
the E.U. ETS in Phases 1 and 2 (Department of Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs, 2005).
21The lead government department in charge of developing the UK plan was the Department
of Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), however the Department of Trade and
Industry and the Environment Agency were also involved. In October 2008, the Department of
Energy and Climate Change (DECC) was formed, and the climate change related functions of
DEFRA were transferred to DECC (UK Civil Service, 2009).
22The political expediency of grandfathering is reflected in the allocation practices of the U.K.
and other E.U. member states. Under Article 10 of Annex III of the E.U. Emissions Trading
Directive, member states had the discretion to sell or auction no more than 5% of permits in
Phase 1 and 10% of permits in Phase 2. Markussen and Svendsen (2005) provide a political
economy explanation for this rule. In Phase 1, only four member states (Denmark, Ireland,
Hungary, and Lithuania) choose to auction any permits, and of these, only Denmark choose to
auction the full 5% (Buchner et al., 2006).
23The New Entrant Reserve consisted of 5.7% of permits in the provisional plan (Department
of Trade and Industry, 2004) and 6.3% in the final plan (Department of Environment, Food,
and Rural Affairs, 2005). Installations that began operation in the middle of the phase were
entitled to permits out of this reserve, which was allocated across sectors based on expected new
entry. Concerns of fairness and competitiveness motivated the provision of costless permits to
new entrants. Providing costless permits to existing installations while forcing new installations
to buy them was perceived as unfair to new installations. Moreover, the UK did not want to
place itself at a competitive disadvantage in attracting new investment (Parker, 2008).
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The remaining permits were allocated to existing installations through a two-
stage procedure that first involved allocations to sectors followed by allocations to
installations within sectors.24 Firms did not receive explicit consideration in this
procedure and could have multiple installations in more than one sector.
The allocations to sectors other than the power generation sector were based
on the expected future emissions of those sectors. The power generation sector
received only a residual allocation equal to the difference between the total cap
and the allocations to all other sectors. Concerns of competitiveness motivated
this differential treatment. Because the power generation sector is insulated from
international competition compared to other sectors, electricity producers were
expected to be able to pass on the costs of permits to their customers.
An individual installation was entitled to a fraction of the permits allocated to
the sector to which it belongs. This fraction was equal to the installation’s share of
the sector’s total “relevant emissions”, which is a measure of historical emissions.
In most cases, an individual installation’s relevant emissions were computed by
averaging annual emissions over a baseline period after dropping the lowest year’s
emissions. For Phase 1, the baseline period was 1998-2003.25 A sector’s relevant
24Such a two-stage procedure was used in almost all member states, Germany being the
notable exception (Ellerman et al., 2007).
25If an installation is not in operation during all years in the baseline period, the averaging
procedure is carried out only over the years during which the installation is active (Department
of Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs 2005, 2007).
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emissions are simply the sum of the relevant emissions of all installations in that
sector.
To summarize, the following formula guided the allocation for an installation
i in sector j:
Allocationi =
RelevantEmissionsi
RelevantEmissionsj
∗ SectorAllocationj. (1.14)
1.3.2 Changes between the Provisional and Final National
Allocation Plan
The government explicitly invited consultation from industry after the publi-
cation of the provisional plan. The sectoral redefinition that emerged from this
consultation was the major cause of changes in allocations between the provisional
and final plans. Sector categories were the subject of much debate during the
formulation of the final plan. The UK’s Department of Trade and Industry was
already involved in projecting sectoral emissions well before the E.U. ETS, and
its projections informed those used in the provisional plan (Ellerman et al., 2007).
However, the sector categories of the provisional plan were widely viewed by
industry as being too coarsely defined. There was a desire for more disaggregated
sector categories whose projections would reflect the particular circumstances of
each industry. In response, the government commissioned independent consultants
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to produce more detailed sectoral projections of output, which the Department
of Trade and Industry then used to project emissions (Ellerman et al., 2007;
Department of Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs, 2005). The number of
sector categories multiplied between the provisional and actual plans. While the
provisional plan had 13 sectors for classifying installations (Department of Trade
and Industry, 2004), the final plan had 51 sectors (Department of Environment,
Food, and Rural Affairs, 2005).26
Aside from sectoral redefinition, the application of alternative rules for deter-
mining an installation’s relevant emissions also contributed to differences between
provisional and final allocations. The final plan reflected the application of special
rules for determining relevant emissions for installations that underwent commis-
sioning, added capacity, and/or were affected by intersite shifting of production
during the baseline period (Ellerman et al., 2007). Installations had to provide
evidence in order to be considered for treatment under these special rules (De-
partment of Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs, 2005).
26Existing climate change regulation in the UK, in particular the Climate Change Agreements
(CCAs), also accounted for this high level of disaggregation. A CCA for a given industry allows
participating facilities to receive an 80% discount on a tax on energy use known as the Climate
Change Levy (CCL), in exchange for commitments to reduce energy use and greenhouse gas
emissions (HM Revenue & Customs, 2012). Sectors in the final plan were differentiated not only
by economic activity but also in terms of whether they were subject to a CCA (Ellerman et al.,
2007). For example, there were two sectors for chemicals, one that was subject to a CCA and
another that was not. This practice was discontinued in Phase 2.
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While sectoral redefinition and the application of special rules are proximate
explanations for differences between provisional and final allocations, it has been
widely emphasized that these were the manifestations of lobbying. According
to Buchner et al. (2006), the allocation process for Phase 1 of the E.U. ETS
in general “can best be described as an extended dialogue between the govern-
ment and industry” in which there was “much lobbying” on the part of industry.
Mallard (2009) remarks that changes between the provisional and final U.K. plans
represent “perhaps the clearest example of the effects of lobbying”. Duggan (2009)
points out that in their pursuit of the maximum number of costless permits, many
companies in the U.K. pleaded to be treated as “’special cases’ or exceptions
to the rules”. The empirical tests in the following section aim to evaluate the
distributional and efficiency consequences of such lobbying.
1.4 Empirical Tests
1.4.1 Data Sources
Provisional and Actual National Allocation Plans
Table 1.1 summarizes the scope of the provisional and final plans. The two
plans do not cover an identical universe of installations. One-hundred sixty four
installations are present in the provisional plan but not in the final plan, and a
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large number of installations were added by the time of the final plan. However,
the degree of overlap is considerable. I am able to match 703 installations between
the two allocation plans, representing well over 90% of the U.K. national cap.27
The total number of permits, whether to all installations or to the matched instal-
lations, remains almost the same in two plans. Thus any changes in allocations
are essentially redistributive.
Considerable redistribution took place at the sectoral level. Table 1.2 displays
the total provisional and final allocations of all matched installations in each of the
thirteen sector categories of the provisional plan. The oil and gas industry, which
encompasses the “Offshore” and “Refineries” sectors, appears to have benefited
in the redistribution, while the “Power Stations” sector lost. To account for such
sectoral shifts, industry controls are included in the empirical specifications.
Firm-level allocations are constructed by aggregating the allocations of instal-
lations operated by the same firm.28 The matched installations represent a total
270 firms.29 As described previously, firms do not receive explicit consideration in
27Matching between the two plan is possible through a unique identification number assigned
to each installation.
28The provisional and actual plans report the firm each installation is associated with. In some
instances, the reported firm may be a subsidiary of another firm. The firm-level allocations I
have constructed include allocations to the firm and its subsidiaries. I have carefully identified
subsdiaries by individually ascertaining the ownership status in 2004 of each reported firm. The
sources relied upon include company websites, financial reports, press releases, and company
descriptions from Hoovers and Bloomberg Businessweek Company Insight Center.
29In the regressions the sample sizes are lower because I exclude universities, hospitals, and
government entities. These entities account for less than 0.5% of the cap in both plans. Also,
lack of financial data accounts for the lower sample size in regressions that include firm financial
variables.
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the formula for allocation, the two-stages of which involve allocations to sectors
and then installations within sectors. The same firm can have multiple installa-
tions, not all of which fall into the same sector. For the subsequent, firm-level,
emprical analysis, each firm is assigned to one of 8 industry categories based on
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. The industry groupings used are:
Chemicals (Major Group 28), Food and Drink (Major Group 20), Fossil Fuels
(Major Groups 12, 13, and 29), Metal Manufacture (Major Groups 33 and 34),
Pulp and Paper (Major Group 26), Stone/Clay/Glass/Concrete (Major Group
32), Transportation Equipment (Major Group 37), and Utilities (Major Group
49).30
The distribution of emissions across firms is highly skewed, with a relatively
small number of large emitters accounting for the bulk of emissions. Figure 1.1
30A firm was placed into one of these groupings primarily on the basis of the sectors its
installations were classified under in the provisional plan. The provisional plan sectors of
“Chemicals”, “Food & Drink”, and “Pulp & Paper” correspond directly to the SIC-based
industry groups. The provisional plan sectors of “Bricks/Ceramics”, “Cement”, “Glass”,
and “Lime” all map to the “Stone/Clay/Glass/Concrete” industry group, while the “Iron &
Steel” and “Non-ferrous sectors” map to Metal Manufacture. “Power Stations” fall under
the Utilities group. The Fossil Fuels group includes firms engaged in the extraction of fossil
fuels and/or refining; the “Offshore” and “Refineries” sectors in the provisional plan fall in
this grouping. Finally, the “Other Combustion Activities” sector includes firms whose business
activities may fall into any of the industry groups; companies that manufacture Transportation
Equipment are included in this sector. The installations of most firms fall into only one
sector of the provisional plan. For firms with installations in more than one sector, there was
typically one dominant sector that represented the core business activity. For example, British
Petroleum is classified in the Fossil Fuels group even though 2 out of its 20 installations fall
in the “Chemicals” sector in the provisional plan. When necessary, the Amadeus database
published by Bureau van Dijk was consulted to establish a firm’s industry grouping. See
http://www.bvdinfo.com/Products/Company-Information/International/AMADEUS.aspx.
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Figure 1.1: Lorenz Curve of Distribution of Emissions across Firms in 2002
plots a Lorenz curve of emissions; the top 20% of emitting firms accounted for
approximately 95% of emissions in 2002.
Political Connections
The data source for political connections is the Register of Members’ Financial
Interests, which is published several times a year by the U.K. House of Commons.31
This publication documents the financial connections to firms of every member of
the House of Commons (MP). Financial connections include gifts from a firm to
the MP, shareholdings, remunerated directorships, and employment.32 I use issues
of the register spanning the years 2000-2004.33 Forty-seven firms had connections
31Issues of the Register can be downloaded from http://www.publications.parliament.
uk/pa/cm/cmregmem.htm.
32Similar measures have been used in other papers on political connections. See for example
Khwaja and Mian (2005), Faccio et al. (2006), and Ferguson and Voth (2008).
33In particular, the following issues were used: November 10, 2000; May 14, 2001; May 14,
2002; November 26, 2002; December 4, 2003; and January 31, 2004.
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to at least one MP during this time; twenty-two firms had connections to only
one MP, fourteen firms had connections to 2-5 MPs, and 11 firms had connections
to more than 5 MPs. The most common type of connection was the receipt of
gifts by MPs from firms. Thirty-four firms gave gifts to at least one MP.34 Less
common forms of connection include employment of MPs (7 firms), having MPs
as shareholders (9 firms), or having MPs on the board of directors (3 firms).
Measuring connections to MPs is not without drawbacks. By focusing on
data from the Register, it is possible to capture only a specific type of political
connection. Other channels through which a firm might wield political influence
are ignored. For example, a firm may be able to positively affect its allocation
through influence at the particular agencies directly involved in the allocation
process. There is no way to quantify such influence.35 However, although it is
incomplete, the data in the Register is plausibly representative in that a firm
connected to MPs is likely to also be influential in other domains and faces a
relatively lower cost of engaging in rent-seeking activities.
Another concern is that instead of being simply an indicator of a firm’s cost
of lobbying, the cultivation of political connections may represent an endogenous
response to the allocation process. To mitigate this concern, I do not consider
34For example, MP Peter Hain (Labour) attended Wimbledon on July 4, 1999, as a guest of
British Petroleum.
35The UK does not systematically collect and release data on the financial connections of
employees from any of the involved agencies.
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instances of political connections created after the release of the provisional plan.
The tight time horizons under which the E.U. ETS came into being also help to
rule out the possibility that the pursuit of higher permit allocations was driving the
formation of political connections. According to Ellerman et al. (2007), as of late
2001 and for some time after, an operational E.U.- wide emissions trading scheme
by 2005 was widely viewed as a low probability scenario. A political agreement on
the E.U. ETS among the then 15 member states was reached only in summer of
2003. Furthermore, as suggested by the growing literature on the topic, political
connections can secure a range of benefits for firms in various regulatory contexts.
The decision of a firm to cultivate connections takes into account the full range
of these benefits, which extend far beyond costless permits. In the short run,
political connections can be reasonably interpreted as indicative of the ease with
which a firm can undertake rent-seeking.
Table 1.3 compares the 47 (privately owned) firms connected to at least one
MP, with the 200 privately owned firms that are not connected to any MP.36
The data on 2002 emissions reveal that the politically connected firms are on
average larger emitters, with the 47 connected firms accounting for well over half of
the total 2002 emissions. However, there are small and large emitters among both
36Although the matched installations represent a total of 270 firms, the comparison in Table
1.3 excludes universities, hospitals, and government entities and hence covers only 247 firms.
Universities, hospitals, and government entities account for less than 0.5% of the cap in both
plans.
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the connected and non-connected firms.37 Because permit allocations are based
on historical emissions, the 47 connected firms unsurprisingly received the bulk of
the permits in both the provisional and final plans. What is notable however, is
the redistribution of permits toward the connected firms. In the transition from
the provisional to the final plan, connected firms gained 2,630,344 permits, while
non-connected firms lost 2,496,817 permits. In percentage terms, firm permit
allocations increased by an (unweighted) average of 32.67%, with non-connected
and connected firms experiencing average increases of 34.22% and 26.08% respec-
tively. However, these unweighted averages disproportionately reflect the influence
of small emitters whose gains in permits were small in absolute terms, but large
relative to their provisional allocations. As demonstrated in Figure 1.1, small
emitters, though numerous, account for only a small fraction of total emissions.
The average percent change, weighted by the firms’ provisional allocatons, better
reflects the reallocation that occured between the provisional and final plans. By
this metric, firms on average experienced negligible change in allocation (0.06%).
However, connected firms gained an average 2.2% while non-connected firms lost
an average of 2.7%.
37Among connected firms, emissions in 2002 ranged between 1,110 tons and 28,439,827 tons.
Among non-connected firms, emissions in 2002 ranged between 57 tons and 19,348,748 tons.
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1.4.2 Results
Distributional Effects of Political Connections
The empirical specifications are motivated by equation (1.13). In the most
basic specification, the natural log of a firm’s realized allocation is regressed on the
natural log of its provisional allocation and a measure of its political connections.
Formally, for firm i,
ln(Final Allocationi) = β1ln(Provisional Allocationi)+β2Politicali+i, (1.15)
where i denotes the stochastic error term. The purpose of the Political variable
is to shed light on ψi from equation (1.13), which indicates the additional permits
gained by a firm with a lower cost of rent-seeking than the non-lobbying firms.
Further specifications also include industry dummy variables and control for other
firm characteristics. In the preferred specifications, the observation for each firm
is weighted by the firm’s provisional allocation. This approach addresses the issue
of scale that is evident in Figure 1.1 and Table 3.38
38Such weighting makes my results comparable to those of Khwaja and Mian (2005), who
analyze the effect of political connectedness on firm default rates on loans from state-owned banks
in Pakistan. Their unit of observation is a firm-bank pair, and they weight each observation by
the number of dollars loaned by the bank to the firm.
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Table 1.4 displays the regression results using a binary measure of political
connections. The variable Politicali takes on a value of 1 if firm i is connected
to at least one MP. Column 1 includes only the provisional allocation and the
Political variable as regressors, while columns 2 and 3 respectively add industry
controls and other firm characteristics. The firm characteristics included are 2003
values of the natural log of fixed assets, natural log of the number of employees, and
profit margin.39 Across all columns, the provisional allocation strongly predicts
the realized allocation; the coefficient on ln(Provisional Allocationi) is slightly
less than 1. The predictive power of the provisional allocation is also reflected in
the extremely high R2 values.
Using the binary measure of political connections, I find at best weak evidence
that politically connected firms benefited in the redistribution of permits. While
the coefficient on Political is positive, it becomes statistically insignificant with
the inclusion of industry controls and firm characteristics.
In the regressions of Table 1.5, the Political variable is measured by the
number of MPs a firm is connected to and its square. As in Table 1.4, column 1 in-
cludes only the provisional allocation and the political variables as regressors, and
columns 2 and 3 respectively add industry controls and other firm characteristics.
39These are obtained from the Amadeus database published by Bureau van Dijk. See http:
//www.bvdinfo.com/Products/Company-Information/International/AMADEUS.aspx.
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The results from Table 1.5 suggest that the degree of connectedness matters.
Moving from no connections to a connection with one MP is associated with
at least a 3.3% increase in the final allocation, and this amount is even higher
(5.4%) when not accounting for firm characteristics and industry.40 The negative
coefficient on the quadratic term suggests diminishing returns from connections
to additional MPs. Unlike the results in Table 1.4, the results using the number of
MPs are statistically significant and relatively stable in magnitude across columns.
The binary measure of political connectedness fails to account for what appear to
be important differences across firms in the strength of connectedness.41
Table 1.6 reproduces the specifications of Table 1.5, but adds a multiplicative
interaction term suggested by the theory. Specifically the interaction term is the
product of the number of MPs firm i is connected to and 1
Provisional Allocationi
. The
coefficient on the interaction term has the opposite sign as suggested by the theory.
However it is never statistically significant, and its inclusion does not materially
alter the results.
I also estimate the regressions in Table 1.5 using an unweighted regression,
however the results fail to attain statistical significance and are unstable. (See
40I also find evidence that connections to MPs are associated with a higher probability of an
upward revision (i.e. a realized allocation higher than the provisional one).
41Number of connections seems to be the only measure of “strength” that matters. Distin-
guishing between types of connections (e.g. gifts vs. shareholdings vs. positions on boards of
directors) does not yield significant results, nor do the results differ if connections are broken
down by political party (e.g. Labour vs. Conservative).
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Table B.1 in Appendix B.) The differences between the unweighted and weighted
regressions suggest that large firms, which account for the bulk of emissions, are
the ones who are able to use political influence to increase their allocations.
Furthermore, I repeat the weighted and unweighted regressions measuring
final and provisional allocations in levels rather than logs. Results from weighted
and unweighted regressions using levels are reported in Appendix B, tables B.2
and B.3, respectively. The weighted results are statistically significant and are
qualitatively consistent with those of Table 1.5. Moving from no connections
to a connection with one MP is associated with over 200,000 extra permits on
average, representing a 0.07 standard deviation increase in the final allocation.
The negative coefficient on the quadratic term suggests diminishing returns to
additional MPs. The results from the unweighted regression are statistically
insignificant but are qualitatively similar.
Calculation of Welfare Loss
The significant benefits associated with political connections suggest distri-
butional consequences of rent-seeking activity during the allocation procedure in
Phase 1 of the E.U. ETS in the U.K.. The reallocation that occurred between the
provisional and final allocation plans appeared to have particularly benefited firms
with strong political connections. The theoretical framework provides a basis to
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calculate the welfare losses from efforts wasted in contesting permits. Under full
dissipation of rents, the amount firms spent on rent-seeking activity is equal to
the value of the contested permits. The value of contested permits is obtained by
multiplying the number of contested permits (φ) by the expected price of a permit
at the time of allocation. Thus any attempt to calculate welfare losses must begin
by characterizing the number of contested permits.
Based on the theoretical framework, it is possible to obtain a lower bound on
the number of contested permits solely by examining the data on provisional and
final allocations, without assuming anything about the relative costs of lobbying
firms face. While the net change in the total number of permits between the
two plans was negligible (133,527 permits, see Table 1.3), some firms lost permits
(losers) while others gained permits (gainers). In particular, the gainers gained
13,862,086 permits, while the losers lost 13,728,559 permits. The losses of the
losers constitute a lower bound on the number of contested permits. In terms
of the theoretical framework, the observation of losers losing 13,728,559 permits
(and gainers gaining virtually the same amount) is incompatible with there being
fewer than 13,728,559 contested permits. Such an observation does not preclude
higher numbers of contested permits; indeed it is still possible that entire cap was
contested. However, it cannot be the case that fewer than 13,728,559 permits
36
Chapter 1. Rent-seeking over Tradable Emission Permits
were contested.42 Multiplying this number by an expected permit price in 2004 of
10 euros (Ellerman and Joskow, 2008) yields a lower bound on the welfare losses
from rent-seeking (137,285,590 euros), assuming full dissipation of rents.
Another way to infer the number of contested permits is to use the estimated
coefficient on ln(Provisional Allocation). This coefficient (β1 in equation (1.15))
corresponds to the quantity (1 − γ) from the theoretical model. An estimate of
φ, denoted φˆ can be calculated as follows:
φˆ =
n∑
i=1
[
Ai − Aβˆ1i
]
, (1.16)
where βˆ1 is an estimate of 1−γ and Ai is firm i’s provisional allocation. Using βˆ1 =
0.993 (Table 1.6, Column 1) and computing the expression (1.16) yields 22,189,151
as an estimate of the number of contested permits and 221,891,510 euros as the
estimated welfare loss. This loss substantially exceeds the lower bound. Even
higher estimates of the number of contested permits and corresponding welfare
losses emerge if the value of βˆ1 is taken from the specifications that control for
firm characteristics and industry (Table 1.6, Columns 2 and 3). However, the
theory does not suggest the inclusion of these controls and the estimated welfare
losses may be implausibly high.
42For example, if the number of contested permits was zero, there would be no gainers or
losers and allocations would remain unchanged.
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The welfare losses from rent-seeking (137,285,590 euros or 221,891,510 euros)
are relatively small compared to the value of the the cap, which is over 2.1 billion
euros. However, the losses are staggering when juxtaposed against the amount
firms spent annually on abatement of emissions. While no estimates exist of
abatement or abatement costs for the U.K. as a whole, it is possible to compare
the welfare losses with E.U.-wide abatement expenditures. Ellerman et al. (2010)
estimate that Phase 1 of the E.U. ETS led to between 40 million and 100 million
tons of abatement annually across all member states at a total cost of 450 million
to 900 million euros. Thus the welfare losses from rent dissipation in the U.K.
alone are substantial relative to annual abatement expenditures in the entire E.U..
The discussion of welfare losses has assumed full-dissipation of rents. The the-
oretical framework predicts full dissipation rents only when there are a sufficiently
large number of lobbying firms. The data do suggest that the number of lobbying
firms is plausibly large enough to lead to full dissipation. For example the number
of firms whose final allocation exceeds the provisional allocation is 160 (k = 160).
The number of firms connected to at least one MP is 47 (k = 47). In either of the
cases, k−1
k
is very close to one, which generates nearly complete rent-dissipation.
It should be emphasized however, that the calculations of welfare loss presented
here are valid only in the case of full dissipation.
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1.5 Conclusion
This paper uses unique data on allocations from Phase 1 of the E.U. ETS in the
U.K. to characterize the distributional and efficiency consequences of rent-seeking
behavior in the context of costless emission permits. The evidence suggests that
firms connected to MPs were able to improve their allocations and that the degree
of connection, as measured by the number of MPs a firm was connected with,
mattered. The welfare losses from rent-seeking behavior represent a significant
cost over and above the abatement costs firms incurred to reduce their emissions.
Considering that Phase 1 was a trial phase of the E.U. ETS, it is plausible that
rent-seeking behavior was more of a factor than in the subsequent phases. As the
rules and regulatory procedures became more established over time, opportunities
and incentives for rent-seeking diminished. Duggan (2009) notes that the formu-
lation of the U.K.’s National Allocation Plan in Phase 2 involved far less agitation
on the part of industry. The welfare loss estimate can be reasonably construed as
a one-time loss rather than an ongoing loss. However, it does offer a cautionary
tale for countries with institutions less effective at curbing rent-seeking activity. If
rent-seeking can occur even in a developed country with strong insitutions like the
U.K., it is likely to play a much bigger role as emissions trading is implemented
in developing countries like China and India.43
43See Liu (2013) and Duflo et al. (2010).
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My results lend support to the use of auctioning as an allocation method
rather than grandfathering. Auctioning avoids rent-seeking over costless permits
and also has an efficiency advantage in that the auction revenues can be used to
offset distortionary taxes.44 However, auctions are not entirely free of political
economy problems. Cramton and Kerr (2002) point out that vested interests
will fight bitterly to oppose auctions in favor of grandfathering. MacKenzie and
Ohndorf (2012) point out that the revenues raised from auction may themselves
become a rent-seeking prize.
44See Goulder et al. (1999) and Cramton and Kerr (2002).
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Table 1.1: Scope of Provisional and Final National Allocation Plans
Provisional Plan Final Plan
Number of Installations 867 1056
Number of Matched Installations 703 703
Total Permits to All Installations 224,575,161 228,204,110
Total Permits to Matched Installations 214,258,348 214,113,670
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Table 1.4: Regressions with Binary Political Variable
Dependent Variable: Ln(Final Allocation) (1) (2) (3)
Ln(Provisional Allocation)
0.995∗∗∗
(0.030)
0.958∗∗∗
(0.059)
0.980∗∗∗
(0.026)
Political
0.131∗
(0.068)
0.142
(0.124)
0.055
(0.045)
ln(Total Fixed Assets)
0.033∗∗∗
(0.009)
ln(Employees)
-0.024
(0.018)
Profit Margin
0.347∗∗
(0.144)
Industry Controls? No Yes Yes
Weighted Regression? Yes Yes Yes
N 247 247 185
R2 0.90 0.92 0.99
Excludes universities, hospitals, and other government entities. Observations weighted by
provisional allocation. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by industry. The
superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively.
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Table 1.5: Regressions with Number of Connected MPs
Dependent Variable: Ln(Final Allocation) (1) (2) (3)
Ln(Provisional Allocation)
0.995∗∗∗
(0.025)
0.966∗∗∗
(0.036)
0.960∗∗∗
(0.031)
Number of MPs
0.054∗∗
(0.021)
0.036∗
(0.018)
0.033∗∗∗
(0.009)
(Number of MPs)ˆ2
-0.0021∗∗
(0.0008)
-0.0014∗
(0.0007)
-0.0012∗∗∗
(0.0003)
ln(Total Fixed Assets)
0.029∗∗∗
(0.008)
ln(Employees)
-0.018
(0.009)
Profit Margin
0.424∗∗
(0.176)
Industry Controls? No Yes Yes
Weighted Regression? Yes Yes Yes
N 247 247 185
R2 0.90 0.91 0.99
Excludes universities, hospitals, and other government entities. Observations weighted by
provisional allocation. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by industry. The
superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively.
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Table 1.6: Regressions with Interaction Term
Dependent Variable: Ln(Final Allocation) (1) (2) (3)
Ln(Provisional Allocation)
0.993∗∗∗
(0.027)
0.965∗∗∗
(0.037)
0.952∗∗∗
(0.032)
Number of MPs
0.055∗∗
(0.021)
0.037∗
(0.019)
0.037∗∗∗
(0.009)
(Number of MPs)ˆ2
-0.0021∗∗
(0.0008)
-0.0014∗
(0.0007)
-0.0013∗∗∗
(0.0003)
Interaction Term
-1048.126
(1560.926)
-1316.413
(875.517)
-3403.007
(1801.976)
ln(Total Fixed Assets)
0.027∗∗
(0.009)
ln(Employees)
-0.013
(0.010)
Profit Margin
0.463∗∗
(0.178)
Industry Controls? No Yes Yes
Weighted Regression? Yes Yes Yes
N 247 247 185
R2 0.90 0.91 0.99
Interaction term is the product of Number of MPs and 1ProvisionalAllocation . Excludes
universities, hospitals, and other government entities. Observations weighted by provisional
allocation. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by industry. The superscripts ***, **,
and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively.
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Institutions and the Resource
Curse within the United States
2.1 Introduction
The term “resource curse” has been widely used to describe the notion that
areas rich in natural resources tend to be poor and often politically oppressed.
The idea of a resource curse is paradoxical in that it appears to violate standard
economic theory, which unambiguously predicts only beneficial effects from greater
resource abundance. However, a cursory glance at the world map reveals numerous
societies that seem to be cursed by their resource wealth. Angola, Congo, Nigeria,
Venezuela, and the Middle East are particularly noteworthy examples of places
that are rich in natural resources, but also characterized by low to negative
GDP growth, vast income inequality, state failure, civil war, corruption, and
political oppression. On the other hand, the more favorable economic and political
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outcomes in other resource-rich countries such as Norway, Canada, Australia,
Malaysia, and Botswana suggest that the resource curse is neither universal nor
unavoidable.
Several theoretical papers argue that the quality of a society’s institutions is
critical to whether resource wealth becomes a curse or not, and this idea has been
corroborated by empirical work. However, most of the empirical work on the
resource curse has relied upon cross-country regressions, with one observation per
country. This approach is problematic; any results indicating a resource curse are
open to skepticism as they may be driven by country-specific unobservable factors
that are correlated with resource wealth. In this paper, I examine the resource
curse hypothesis, including its institutional dimension, using cross-sectional data
from political subdivisions (states) within a single country (the United States).
This strategy eliminates cross-country heterogeneity.1 Furthermore, a within-
country study allows the researcher to dispense with certain explanations for the
resource curse, such as those involving an exchange rate mechanism, while focusing
on the potential of other explanations (e.g. institutions).
As I explain in detail later, the U.S. presents a fruitful venue for studying
the resource curse. The variations in resource wealth, economic performance,
and institutional quality across U.S. states are salient enough to provide insight
1Although unobserved cross-state heterogeneity remains, it is arguably less problematic than
cross-country heterogeneity.
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into the role of institutions in the resource curse phenomenon. In spite of this,
little work has been undertaken on the topic. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) were
the first to analyze the resource curse hypothesis with respect to U.S. states,
and indeed the first to abandon the dominant cross-country paradigm. They find
evidence that resource wealth is correlated with lower economic growth among the
cross-section of U.S. states. I build on the work of Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007)
by explicitly considering the role that institutional quality plays in mediating
the effects of resource wealth on economic outcomes. This is accomplished by
including a multiplicative interaction term between resource wealth (as measured
by share of mining in gross state product) and institutional quality (as measured
by per capita political corruption convictions) in the regression specifications.2
In contrast to Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007), I find robust evidence that among
the cross-section of U.S. states, resource wealth in itself is associated with higher
economic growth. However, I also find evidence that poor institutional quality can
erode or even reverse the advantages of resource wealth. This result is consistent
with earlier theoretical and cross-country empirical work arguing that the resource
curse is essentially an institutional phenomenon.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes
previous work on institutions and the resource curse and argues that the U.S.
2The inclusion of such an interaction term was first advocated by Mehlum et al. (2006) in a
cross-country framework.
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provides a valuable setting in which to study this topic; Section 3 presents the
empirical strategy and results; Section 4 offers concluding remarks.
2.2 Economic Performance, Resources, and In-
stitutions: the U.S. Context
2.2.1 Institutions and the Resource Curse
Recent theoretical literature on the resource curse has focused on institutional
explanations, which stand in contrast to earlier, market-based explanations such
as the “Dutch Disease” theory. Formulated to explain the poor economic per-
formance of the Netherlands following the discovery of oil in the North Sea, this
theory postulates that a natural resource boom causes a country’s currency to
appreciate, harming the competitiveness of its manufacturing exports. Dutch
disease proponents see manufacturing exports as the engine of growth; according
to their view, a resource boom that crowds out manufacturing exports will retard
growth (Deacon and Rode 2012). Sachs and Warner (1997, 2001), who provided
some of the earliest empirical evidence for the resource curse, emphasize the Dutch
Disease explanation. However, as Bulte et al. (2005) point out, the Dutch Disease
theory cannot account for the numerous exceptions to the resource curse or the
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highly varied growth experiences of resource-rich countries. It also cannot explain
a widely observed empirical regularity that the resource curse only applies to
spatially concentrated natural resources such as mineral and oil deposits, while
spatially diffuse (e.g. agricultural) resources seem to be immune.3 Moreover, the
theory cannot apply to the case of U.S. states as they share a common currency
and real prices vary relatively little among them (Goldberg et al., 2008).
The idea that natural resource wealth can be a rent-seeking prize plays a
central role in institutional explanations for the resource curse. It has been
widely argued that governance institutions ineffective at curbing rent-seeking
activity underpin the failures of societies to realize benefits from their natural
resource wealth (Congleton et al., 2008). In settings with ineffective institutions,
economic agents are drawn into a common pool competition over resource rents
that ultimately translates into welfare losses. This competition not only leads
to full dissipation of the rents, but actually lowers welfare by drawing inputs
away from productive economic activity (Deacon and Rode, 2012). Important
theoretical papers linking resource wealth to welfare losses via such a mechanism
include Lane and Tornell (1996), Tornell and Lane (1999), Torvik (2002), Mehlum
et al. (2006), and Hodler (2006).4 The logic of rent-seeking is consistent with the
3Leite and Weidmann (1999), Isham et al. (2003), and Boschini et al. (2005) all report this
result.
4Deacon and Rode (2012) provide a survey of theoretical and empirical research at the
intersection of rent-seeking and the resource curse. Deacon (2012) surveys political economy
aspects of the resource curse more generally.
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observation that the resourse curse applies specifically to spatially concentrated
resources. The rents from these resources are a readily available and easily tapped
source of revenue for governments. In the absence of strong institutional barriers,
economic agents find it optimal to compete for a share of this revenue rather than
engage in productive economic activity, and a clientelistic political economy takes
hold.
Circumstantial evidence, for example from oil-rich Venezuela and Nigeria,
bears out the notion that political elites vying for access to resource rents can
lead governments to make inefficient economic decisions and ultimately cripple
economic growth.5 During the oil price spike of 1979-81, Venezuela’s public
spending on infrastructure and industrial subsidies, which mainly accrued to
political elites, increased so sharply that the country actually registered a current
account deficit. The country’s per capita output fell by an average of 1.4% per
year between 1970 and 1990 despite a run-up in the price of oil over this period
(Lane and Tornell, 1996, pg. 216). In Nigeria, government transfers as a share
of GDP more than doubled between 1970 and the early 1980s (Tornell and Lane,
1999). The dramatic rise in income inequality during an extended period of rising
oil prices (1970-early 2000’s) suggests that these transfers enriched political elites
5In extreme cases the struggle to capture natural resource wealth can turn into violent
conflict, as exemplified by civil wars in Angola, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and the former Zaire
(Deacon, 2012). Ross (2006) surveys the literature on natural resource wealth and violent
conflict. Collier and Hoeﬄer (1998, 2004) make key empirical contributions in this area.
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rather than benefiting the country at large. In 1970, the income of the top 2%
of the population equalled that of the bottom 17%; by 2000 the top 2% earned
as much as the bottom 55% (van der Ploeg, 2011, pgs. 367-8). At the same time
Nigeria’s per capita GDP was 30% lower in 2000 than in 1965 (Heston et al.,
2002). In contrast, the superior economic performance of another oil-rich country,
Norway, over the same period can be attributed at least in part to institutions that
were comparatively effective at keeping rent-seeking activity in check (Deacon,
2012).
The critical role of institutional quality has found support in empirical work
such as that of Mehlum et al. (2006).6 Using data from a cross-section of countries,
these authors find that natural resource wealth is correlated with slow economic
growth when institutional quality is low but do not find evidence for a resource
curse in countries where institutional quality is high. They highlight the need to
include a multiplicative interaction term between resource wealth and institutional
quality in order to allow the effects of resource wealth to vary by institutional
6Lane and Tornell (1996) and Collier and Goderis (2009) also empirically validate the
importance of institutional quality.
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quality.7 I follow the basic approach of Mehlum et al. (2006) in testing the
resource curse hypothesis in the context of U.S. states.8
2.2.2 The U.S. Context
Figure 2.1 reveals a negative relationship between economic growth and natural
resource wealth across U.S. states. The vertical axis plots the average annual
growth in a state’s real per capita Gross State Product (GSP) between 1987 and
2000; the horizontal axis plots the share of mining in 1987 GSP. While Figure 2.1
does not in itself constitute evidence of a resource curse9, the negative relationship
between a state-level measure of resource wealth and long-run economic perfor-
mance mirrors the similar relationship observed across countries.10 Any study
7Mehlum et al. (2006) augmented the empirical specification of Sachs and Warner (2001) by
including the interaction term. Their outcome variable is a country’s growth in per capita income
between 1970 and 1990. They represent institutional quality by an index that combines ratings
(from the International Country Risk Guide) on corruption in government, risk of contract
repudiation, risk of expropriation, bureaucratic quality and rule of law. Following Sachs and
Warner (2001), they represent natural resource wealth by the share of primary products in
the country’s exports. Other control variables include initial income, openness to trade, and
investment to GDP ratio.
8The institutional literature on the resource curse has recognized that institutions are not
immutable and that a windfall of resource wealth can alter institutions for the worse by making
them more conducive to rent-seeking and otherwise weakening property rights, democracy, or
political stability (Aslaksen and Torvik, 2006; Hodler, 2006; Mehlum et al., 2006; Robinson
et al., 2006). This is particularly true if institutions were already weak prior to the windfall.
Neither Mehlum et al. (2006) nor this paper empirically test this type of a prediction. However
Caselli and Michaels (2013), Tsui (2010), and Vicente (2010) do provide empirical evidence
suggesting institutional impairment in the wake of a resource windfall. The effect of resource
windfalls on institutional quality in U.S. states is a promising avenue for future research.
9It should be noted that the downward slope of the best-fit line in Figure 2.1 is driven by
three states (Louisiana, Wyoming, and Alaska) whose economies heavily depend on mining.
10See Figure 1 in Sachs and Warner (2001) for a cross-country plot.
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Figure 2.1: Economic Growth and Natural Resource Wealth in U.S. States
of the resource curse phenomenon in the U.S. context can thus complement the
already extensive body of cross-country studies.
In addition to the variations in resource wealth and long-run economic growth,
measures of corruption suggest that U.S. states also differ considerably in the
quality of their institutions. The U.S. Department of Justice publishes annual
data on the number of federal, state, and local public officials in each state
convicted in federal court of a corruption related crime. Because the data covers
corruption convictions in a federal rather than a state court, it is relatively
uncontaminated by state-level judicial corruption and is therefore comparable
across states. While a state’s year-to-year fluctuations in convictions may reflect
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either increased corruption or a “clean-up” effort, it can be plausibly argued
that an average of corruption convictions (normalized by population) over a
long time span suitably captures the friendliness of the state’s institutions to
corruption/rent-seeking activities (Grooms, 2012). In their pioneering analysis
of the resource curse in the U.S. context, Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) use per
capita corruption convictions between 1990 and 2000 as a proxy for state-level
institutional debility. While they include this proxy as a control variable, I extend
their analysis by also interacting it with the measure of natural resource wealth.
Table 2.1 displays the top 10 and bottom 10 states in average per capita
corruption convictions between 1976 and 2008. The most corrupt state (Alaska)
has on average more than 7 times the per capita corruption convictions as the
least corrupt state (Oregon). The data in Table 2.1 broadly conform to a priori
perceptions about which states are relatively more corrupt. What is particularly
striking is that the ten most corrupt states incude several whose economies are
centered on natural resource extraction. Indeed five of these states (Alaska,
Louisiana, Montana, North Dakota, and Oklahoma) also rank in the top 10 by
share of mining in 1987 GSP. However, not all resource-rich states rank high in
corruption. For example, Utah and Nevada have relatively high shares of mining
in 1987 GSP (around 5% in both states), but respectively rank 5th and 15th from
the bottom in corruption.
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This paper is not the first to propose that a resource curse might operate
within the U.S. through an institutional channel. In public policy debates during
the first three decades of the twentieth century, when the U.S. was the major global
oil producer, it was not uncommon to associate oil production with “misdirected
investment, low growth, and spectacular waste” (Goldberg et al., 2008, p. 498).
For instance, Ise (1928) observed that oil wealth fostered misallocation of capital,
investment in rent-seeking activities, and an unequal distribution of income. This
type of discourse predated any formal academic study of the resource curse by
several decades.
Anecdotally, the oil-rich state of Louisiana has been cited as an example of
a “resource-cursed” state within the U.S.. A recent article in the Washington
Post notes that “instead of blessing Louisiana with prosperity, the oil industry
fostered dependency, corruption and an indifference to environmental damage”.
Through much of the twentieth century, Louisiana’s government was dominated
by members of the Long family, who engaged in clientelistic distribution of oil
royalties (Mufson, 2010) via a system of control that “more nearly matched the
power of a South American dictator than that of any other American state boss”
(Key, 1949, p. 156). Despite its oil wealth, Louisiana ranks next to last among
U.S. states in life expectancy, infant mortality, and percentage of the population
living below the poverty line. It also ranks fourth in the violent crime rate, sixth
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in income inequality11, and forty-sixth in the percentage of people over 25 with a
college degree (Mufson, 2010).12
Aside from anecdotal accounts, a handful of recent academic studies have
focused on the institutional aspects of the resource curse in U.S. states.13 Goldberg
et al. (2008) document a negative relationship between resource wealth and
economic growth in U.S. states and also present evidence that resource-rich states
tend to have less competitive politics than other states. They argue that resource
rents allow incumbent politicians to remain in power by purchasing clientelistic
support while keeping direct taxes on citizens low.14 Dunn (2008) finds that
natural resource wealth is associated with lower welfare in U.S. states.15 She
argues for an institutional explanation for this “resource curse”, noting that a
state’s resource wealth is positively associated with several variables that could
signal rent-seeking activity, including the number of law firms per capita and
number of political organizations per capita. Finally, in a result mirroring that
11See Adelson (2012).
12Gylfason (2001) postulates that natural resource wealth can cause a nation to neglect
investment in human capital. Birdsall et al. (2001) also posit a link between natural resource
wealth and low investment in education, but through a political channel.
13Not all studies of the resource curse hypothesis in the U.S. have focused on institutional
aspects. Aadland and James (2011) find evidence of a resource curse among U.S. counties, but
do not consider the possibility of county-level institutional differences.
14This argument hearkens back to the rentier state theory. See Ross (1999) for a review of
the rentier state theory.
15Several measures of welfare are used, including the poverty rate, health insurance coverage,
birth weight, infant mortality, and income inequality. As in Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007),
resource wealth is measured by the share of GSP in the primary sector.
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of Mehlum et al. (2006), Corey (2009) demonstrates that economic freedom can
mitigate the negative growth effects of resource wealth in U.S. states.16
2.3 Empirical Strategy and Results
2.3.1 Natural Resource Wealth and Economic Growth
The starting point of my empirical specifications is the landmark study of
Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007). In Table 2, I attempt to reproduce their results
using currently available data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).17
Their basic specification is
16Corey (2009) uses cross-sectional data on U.S. states; a state’s level of economic freedom
is represented by an index published by the Fraser Institute (Karabegovic et al., 2008). Sobel
(2008) claims that the economic freedom index captures a state’s institutional quality in that
it is positively correlated with various measures of productive entrepreneurship (i.e. birth rate
for large firm establishment, birth rate for total firm establishment, venture-capital investment
per capita, patents per capita, and birth rate of sole proprietorships) and negatively correlated
with measures of rent-seeking behavior (i.e. lobbying organizations per capita).
17Since the work of Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) the BEA has changed the way it calculates
GSP, and figures from previous years were changed to reflect the new methodology. As currently
reported, GSP figures from years 1997 and later are based on the North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS) while those from 1997 and earlier are based on the Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) system. (See http://www.bea.gov/regional/docs/product/
methods.cfm.) The use of one system versus another makes a difference not only in the
breakdown of GSP by industry, but also in the figures for total GSP (personal communication:
Wang, 2012). Because GSP figures for 1997 are reported according to both systems, it is possible
to “bridge” the discontinuity. For example, an SIC-based GSP for 1998 could be constructed for
a given state by applying a growth rate (derived from the reported, NAICS-based 1997 and 1998
GSP figures) to the reported, SIC-based GSP for 1997. This type of conversion has been done
by other U.S. government agencies (see for example the Energy Information Administration
(EIA): http://www.eia.gov/state/seds/sep_use/notes/use_gdp.pdf) and is also used in
this paper.
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Growth1987−2000 = α + γ ∗ LnY1987 + β ∗Natural ResourceWealth+
ψ ∗ Corruption+ λ ∗ x+ .
(2.1)
The dependent variable is average annual percentage growth rate of real per
capita GSP between 1987 and 2000.18 The explanatory variables are natural
log of the initial real per-capita GSP in 1987 (LnY1987), the share of mining in
1987 GSP (a proxy for natural resource wealth)19, corruption convictions between
1991 and 200020 per 100,000 citizens (a proxy for institutional debility), and a
vector x of other control variables including investment, schooling, openness,
and research and development (R&D) spending21 as a fraction of 1987 GSP.
Investment is measured by the share of industrial machinery production in 1987
GSP. Schooling is measured by the share of educational services in 1987 GSP.
Openness is measured by the sum of a state’s net international migration for
1990-1999, divided by the state’s population in 1990.22 The constant term in
18Although Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) consider the years 1986-2000, the BEA’s real per
capita GSP series, as currently reported, begins only in 1987.
19Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) also use the share of primary products (a sector that
encompasses mining of metals and fuels as well as agriculture, forestry, and fisheries) as a proxy
for resource wealth. However, they point out that their results are driven by the mining sector.
This is consistent with the notion that the resource curse applies only to spatially concentrated
resources. Accordingly, I focus specifically on the share of mining rather than primary products.
20Data on state-level corruption convictions is obtained from the Public Integrity Section of
the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.
21Data on state-level R&D spending in 1987 is obtained from the National Science Foundation.
22Population and net international migration figures are sourced from the Census Bureau.
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the regression is denoted by α, while  denotes the idiosyncratic error term. A
negative estimate of the coefficient on natural resource wealth (β) would suggest
a resource curse.
The results displayed in Table 2.2 are roughly similar in magnitude to those of
Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) and also exhibit the same general pattern across the
different specifications.23 The strongest evidence for a resource curse comes from
the specification in column 2, in which only natural resource wealth and initial
income are included as explanatory variables. Although the estimated coefficient
on natural resource wealth is not statistically significant at conventional levels,
it does represent an economically substantial effect. An increase in the share of
GSP from mining by one standard deviation (0.077) decreases the annual growth
rate by 0.27 percentage points (0.077*-3.48). The effect however, fails to hold as
more explanatory variables are added; in columns 3-7, the coefficient on natural
resource wealth becomes increasingly insignificant both from an economic and
statistical standpoint. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) construe this as evidence
that the resource curse operates through indirect channels. They argue that
natural resource wealth negatively affects economic growth via its impact on
other explanatory variables and provide calculations suggesting that education
is the most important transmission channel.
23See Table 1 in Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) for the analogous results.
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2.3.2 The Mediating Role of Institutional Quality
In Table 2.3, I augment the regressions in Table 2.2 with an interaction term
obtained by multiplying the variables for natural resource wealth and corruption.
The necessity of incorporating such an interaction into empirical specifications
was forcefully pointed out by Mehlum et al. (2006) and reiterated by Deacon
(2012). The augmented specification is
Growth1987−2000 = α + γ ∗ LnY1987 + β ∗Natural ResourceWealth+
ψ ∗ Corruption+ φ ∗ Interaction+ λ ∗ x+ .
(2.2)
Prior theoretical and empirical literature suggests that the coefficient on the
interaction term (ψ) should be negative (i.e. natural resource wealth is more of a
curse when institutions are weak.)
Inclusion of the interaction term leads to a striking reversal of the results
in Table 2.2. For purposes of comparison, column 1 of Table 2.3 reproduces a
basic regression without the interaction term. In the subsequent columns of Table
2.3 that do include the interaction term, the estimated coefficient on natural
resource wealth (β) actually becomes positive and though it is not statistically
significant, its magnitude remains relatively stable even with the addition of other
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explanatory variables.24 As expected, the estimated coefficient on the interaction
term (ψ) is consistently negative and is significant at the 10% level in columns 3
and 4. Moreover, the two estimated coefficients β and ψ are jointly significant at
the 10% level in column 2.
The results in Table 2.3 suggest that among U.S. states, resource wealth does
not appear be a curse in itself; if anything it is a blessing. In the absence of
corruption, a one standard deviation increase in the share of GSP from mining
(0.077) is associated with anywhere from a 0.38 to 0.57 percentage point increase
in the annual growth rate, depending on the specification. Poor institutions can,
however, substantially reduce or even eliminate these gains. By comparing the
estimated coefficients on natural resource wealth and the interaction term, it is
possible to characterize the level of corruption needed to eliminate the positive
effect of natural resources. According to any of the specifications in Table 2.3,
the positive effect is more than eliminated for states with 4 or more corruption
convictions per 100,000 citizens during 1991-2000. Ten states meet this criterion,
including a number of resource rich states such as Alaska, Louisiana, and the
Dakotas.25
24Although the positive coefficients on natural resources are not statistically significant
at conventional levels, the significance does not greatly diminish with the addition of other
variables.
25The number of corruption convictions per 100,000 citizens during 1991-2000 ranges from 0.58
(in Colorado) to 7.49 (in Mississippi). The average across all states is 3.05 and the standard
deviation is 1.61.
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2.4 Concluding Remarks
This paper contributes to an understanding of the possible mechanisms that
might explain the resource curse phenomenon in the U.S. context. An under-
standing of the mechanisms is essential if any effective policy recommendations
are to be made. As Deacon (2012) points out, simply verifying that resource
wealth is correlated with slow growth is of little practical value. On the other
hand, showing that the resource curse is a consequence of weak institutions can
spur policy discussions aimed at institutional reform.
Focusing on states within the U.S. has several advantages over previous cross-
country, cross-sectional studies, which typically lump together observations from
developing and developed countries. A within-country approach allows the re-
searcher to avoid comparing the outcomes of countries that differ vastly in un-
quantifiable and unobservable ways. It also rules out the possibility of exchange
rate-based mechanisms such as the Dutch Disease theory, while still leaving scope
for institutional mechanisms, especially in a large and diverse country like the
U.S.. My results from the U.S. suggest that the resource curse hypothesis and
particularly the critical role of institutional quality are relevant even in a developed
country context.26
26In this regard, my work contributes to a broader literature on the importance of cross-state
differences in institutional quality within the U.S. (Glaeser and Saks, 2006; Leeson and Sobel,
2008; Grooms, 2012).
69
Chapter 2. Institutions and the Resource Curse
The beneficial effect of natural resource wealth on economic growth that I find
in the absence of poor institutions is consistent with the historical experience of
the U.S. as a whole. Several papers have stressed that natural resource wealth
was integral to the growth of the American economy in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century. Wright (1990) ascribes the U.S. dominance in manu-
facturing at the turn of the 20th century to technological progress originating
in the American mining sector. David and Wright (1997) and Wright (2001)
note that mining enabled the establishment of prestigious educational institutions
that diffused knowledge to other sectors. Walker (2001) and McClean (2005)
argue that discoveries of gold and other natural resources propelled long-term
economic development in the state of California. However, as a counterpoint
to these narratives, I also find that the potential gains from natural resource
wealth may not be realized in settings with weak institutions. This is consistent
with theoretical models as well as with the experiences of resource-rich states
such as Alaska and Louisiana and countries such as Venezuela and Nigeria. My
results reinforce the importance of including an interaction term between the
measures of resource wealth and institutional quality in any test of the resource
curse hypothesis.
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Table 2.1: Most and Least Corrupt States
Average Corruption (per 100,000 citizens), 1976-2008
Lowest 10 states Highest 10 states
Oregon 0.084 Oklahoma 0.420
Washington 0.104 Montana 0.425
Minnesota 0.122 Alabama 0.446
New Hampshire 0.123 Illinois 0.452
Utah 0.134 Tennessee 0.472
Vermont 0.139 North Dakota 0.514
Iowa 0.141 South Dakota 0.539
Nebraska 0.142 Louisiana 0.587
Colorado 0.147 Mississippi 0.591
Wisconsin 0.165 Alaska 0.616
This table presents corruption convictions per capita
averaged over 1976 to 2008. These data are from the U.S.
Department of Justice’s “Report to Congress on the
Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section”.
(Source: Grooms, 2012)
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Table 2.3: Regression Results with Interaction Term
Dependent Variable: Growth1987−2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 28.50
(5.27)
24.94
(4.98)
23.54
(4.75)
23.68
(4.69)
27.16
(3.99)
31.18
(4.32)
Ln Y1987
-2.55
(-4.76)
-2.21
(-4.50)
-2.11
(-4.38)
-2.13
(-4.31)
-2.49
(-3.67)
-2.92
(-4.05)
Natural
Resource
Wealth
-2.54
(-1.19)
4.95
(1.04)
7.30
(1.45)
7.35
(1.45)
6.37
(1.17)
5.72
(1.01)
Corruption -0.16
(-3.10)
-0.09
(-1.50)
-0.05
(-0.68)
-0.05
(-0.68)
-0.07
(-0.91)
-0.06
(-0.77)
Interaction -1.81
(-1.63)
-2.21
(-1.86)
-2.21
(-1.85)
-1.82
(-1.40)
-1.45
(-1.11)
Investment 12.56
(2.47)
12.35
(2.37)
13.92
(2.66)
15.83
(3.23)
Schooling 3.43
(0.21)
6.13
(0.37)
8.00
(0.47)
Openness 6.89
(1.16)
9.28
(1.42)
R&D 7.88
(1.01)
Joint Test 0.091 0.112 0.122 0.337 0.541
N 50 50 50 50 50 49
Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics in parentheses (White, 1980). Data on R&D is
unavailable for Delaware, hence N = 49 in regression 6. The penultimate row reports
p-values for the test of joint significance of the coefficients on natural resource wealth
and the interaction term.
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Estimating Treatment Effects
with Interference (co-authored
with Douglas G. Steigerwald)
3.1 Introduction
The bulk of the methodological and applied work on treatment effects has
assumed that an individual’s outcome may vary only with his own treatment.
Rubin (1978) calls this the “Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption” (SUTVA).
However, in many contexts, such an assumption is untenable; an individual’s treat-
ment response can depend both on his own treatment as well as the treatments of
others whom he interacts with. This phenomenon has been termed “interference”
in the statistics literature and is salient in a wide range of settings.1 For example,
the probability of an individual contracting an infectious disease depends not
1See Sobel (2006), Rosenbaum (2007), and Hudgens and Halloran (2008).
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only on his own vaccination status, but also on the vaccination of those whom
he interacts with. Job-training programs are another setting where interference
matters; the benefits from job-training are likely diminished if the training were
extended to the entire workforce.2
We develop both a framework to conceptualize treatment effects in situations
characterized by interference and a linear regression method to estimate these
effects. Our framework distinguishes between direct treatment effects (due to a
change in an individual’s treatment status) and indirect treatment effects (due
to changes in the treatment status of others). If a researcher can observe at
least two, non-overlapping groups within which individuals interact, then under
certain assumptions, a full range of direct and indirect treatment effects can be
identified and estimated. We highlight the importance of correctly specifying own
treatment and others’ treatments in a linear regression. Misleading estimates
can result if these two components are conflated in the regression specification.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops a framework
2The central concerns of the peer effects literature are not the same as those of the literature
on interference. Although interference is implied in peer effects, the peer effects literature
has focused on identifying the specific channels through which interference affects outcomes.
In particular, the literature has attempted to separately identify exogenous peer effects (i.e.
effect of peer characteristics on own outcomes) and endogenous peer effects (i.e. effect of peer
outcomes on own outcomes). Any attempt to disentangle these two effects must address the
reflection problem (Manski, 1993); see Bramoullé et al. (2009) and Bramoullé and Fortin (2010)
for examples of ways to address the reflection problem. We do not attempt to disentangle
endogenous and exogenous effects. We instead focus on identifying and estimating the relative
impacts on of own treatment and the treatment of other individuals.
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of potential outcomes under interference; Section 3 discusses identification of
population average treatment effects in various settings; Section 4 deals with
estimation of these treatment effects in a linear regression framework; Section
5 concludes.
3.2 Average Treatment Effects under Interfer-
ence
To fix ideas, consider a randomized experiment on a set of n individuals
(henceforth referred to as a “group”).3 Suppose k of these n individuals are
selected to receive a treatment. We assume a randomization design such that any
set of k individuals is equally likely to be selected for treatment.
Assumption 3.1: Consider a randomized experiment in which k individuals
out of n are to be selected to receive treatment. The probability that any given set
of k individuals receives treatment is
(
n!
(n−k)!k!
)−1
.
As a consequence of Assumption 3.1, the probability that any given individual
receives treatment is k
n
.4
3Throughout this paper, we assume that a group is exogenously formed.
4Assumption 3.1 can be generalized to accommodate stratified randomization within the
group. An example would be an experiment in which the researcher would like to ensure that a
certain number of women are selected for treatment.
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The framework of potential outcomes conceptualizes the impact of treatment
on the outcome.5 Let Ti be the indicator of treatment, so that Ti = 1 indicates
that individual i receives treatment. Historically, the potential outcomes frame-
work has assumed that there is no interference, so that the outcome for individual
i, Yi, depends only on the treatment indicator for individual i: Yi = fi (Ti). This
framework has also assumed that outcomes have no unobserved error component,
so that once treatment is assigned outcomes are deterministic (hence fi (1) is not a
random quantity).6 We retain the assumption that outcomes have no unobserved
error component, while allowing for interference.
In the case of interference, the treatment statuses of all n individuals can
potentially impact the outcome of any one individual. The n-dimensional vector
of treatment indicators, Z, is defined as
Z = (T1, . . . , Tn) .
Because the outcome for individual i depends on the treatment status of other in-
dividuals, we represent the outcome as a function of the entire treatment indicator
5The potential outcomes framework was developed by Neyman (1923) and Fisher (1926) in
the context of randomized experiments and extended by Rubin (1974) to nonrandomized studies.
6Technically one can conceive that an individual’s outcome is a function of two random
processes- 1) assignment to treatment and 2) an unobserved error component. However, because
the actual outcome of a given individual is typically observed only once, one can implicitly
condition on the realization of the unobserved error component. It is therefore possible to
interpret fi(1) and fi(0) as non-random. This practice is standard in the potential outcomes
literature. See, for example, Angrist et al. (1996).
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vector: Yi = fi (Z). In the absence of interference, there are only two potential
outcomes for each individual (fi (0) , fi (1)). Interference leads to an exponential
increase in the number of potential outcomes. Because Yi is a function of the
entire vector Z and Z can take on one of 2n possible values, the set of potential
outcomes contains 2n elements rather than two elements.
To clearly define treatment effects under interference, it is helpful to partition
Z as
(
Ti, Z(i)
)
where Z(i) is the vector of dimension n − 1 that contains the
treatment indicators for everyone other than individual i. This allows us to express
outcomes as a function of own treatment status and the treatment status of others:
Yi = fi(Ti, Z(i)). We use lower-case letters ti and z(i) to denote specific values of Ti
and Z(i). An individual treatment effect, τi(ti, z(i); t′i, z′(i)) = fi(ti, z(i))−fi(t′i, z′(i)),
compares individual i’s outcome under two treatment vectors (ti, z(i)) and (t′i, z′(i)).
In contrast to the case without interference, in which individual i’s treatment
effect is uniquely defined as τi = fi(1)− fi(0), with interference there are multiple
possible treatment effects for individual i. Two classes of individual treatment
effects deserve special mention. A direct effect compares two potential outcomes
that vary only due to changes in own treatment (t 6= t′ but z(i) = z′(i)), for example
τi(1, z(i); 0, z(i)). Direct effects can be seen as a natural extension of the case of no
interference. In contrast an indirect effect compares two potential outcomes that
vary only due to changes in others’ treatment status (t = t′ but z(i) 6= z′(i)), for
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example τi(0, z(i); 0, z′(i)). Indirect effects are novel in that they would not exist
(i.e. would be equal to zero) in the case of no interference.
The inability to observe the outcome of the same individual under two distinct
treatment statuses has been referred to as the Fundamental Problem of Causal
Inference by Holland (1986). To emphasize this point, when there is no interfer-
ence, researchers often refer to the quantities fi(1) and fi(0) as a counterfactual
set. In the presence of interference the fact that one cannot observe the same
individual with treatment and no treatment is joined by the fact that one cannot
hold both the number of treated individuals in a group constant and hold z(i)
constant, while allowing ti to vary.
Because individual treatment effects are based on counterfactual sets, they
are impossible to identify. Therefore, researchers have focused on the average
treatment effect for the population of individuals. Absent interference the (pop-
ulation) average treatment effect is simply 1
n
∑n
i=1 (fi(1)− fi(0)).7 While it is
possible to analogously construct an average treatment effect under interference
as 1
n
∑n
i=1 τi(ti, z(i); t′i, z′(i)), we take a more general approach that encompasses
a range of effects identifiable through common research designs. In the general
7It should be emphasized that the population average treatment effect involves an average
only over heterogenous treatment responses across individuals, as we have abstracted away from
randomness within an individual’s own treatment response.
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approach, we define average treatment effects in terms of possible sets of n − 1
length vectors ZA and ZB:
τ(t,ZA; t′,ZB) ≡ 1
n
n∑
i=1
[E(Yi|Ti = t, Z(i) ∈ ZA)− E(Yi|Ti = t′, Z(i) ∈ ZB)]. (3.1)
The source of randomness in (3.1) is the assignment of individuals to treatment.
The expectations operator applies over the values of Z(i) that fall in the set ZA or
ZB. Although the sets ZA and ZB are defined generally in (3.1), a leading case
of empirical interest is when these sets represent a particular fraction of other
individuals who are treated.
As a concrete example, consider a case in which k = 50 members from a
group of n = 100 are treated. If t = 1 then ZA is the set of vectors of length
99 in which 49 elements are 1, while if t′ = 0, then ZB is the set of vectors
of length 99 in which 50 elements are 1. In this case, under Assumption 3.1,
τ(1,ZA; 0,ZB) = 1100
∑100
i=1
[(
99!
(50)!49!
)−1∑
ω∈ZA (fi(1, ω)− fi(0, ω))
]
.8 Of course,
the definition in (3.1) is general and could nest the difference in expectations
under any two scenarios, for instance − a) being treated and having one-half of
8There are
(
99!
(50)!49!
)
possible vectors of length 99 containing 49 ones and 50 zeros. Under
Assumption 3.1, each of these vectors has equal probability of being realized. There are also(
99!
(50)!49!
)
possible vectors of length 99 containing 50 ones and 49 zeros, and similarly under
Assumption 3.1, each of these vectors has equal probability of being realized.
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others treated versus b) being untreated and having one-third of others treated
− averaged over all individuals in the population. The concepts of direct effect
(t 6= t′ but ZA = ZB) and indirect effect (t = t′ but ZA 6= ZB) also apply to the
average treatment effect.
In summary, the presence of interference alters the potential outcomes frame-
work in two distinct ways. First, and most obviously, the outcome for an
individual depends on the treatment status of other individuals. Second, a
counterfactual set of potential outcomes may consist of outcomes in which only
the treatment status of others changes.
The presence of interference also complicates the population average treatment
effect in two important ways. First, it is not a unique quantity and depends on the
type of comparison of interest to the researcher. Second, the randomization design
used by the researcher is implicit in its definition; in particular, the probabilities
involved in determining E(Yi|Ti = t, Z(i) = ZA) and E(Yi|Ti = t, Z(i) = ZB)
depend on the randomization design.
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3.3 Identification of Population Average Treat-
ment Effects
We now ask: What average treatment effects can be identified with data from
n individuals in a single group? We address this question under two settings.
In the first, the expected outcome of individual i (e.g. E(Yi|Ti = t, Z(i) = ZA))
cannot be reduced to a simpler expression. In the second, the expected outcome of
individual i can be expressed in terms of the fraction of others receiving treatment,
which requires less information than is contained in entire treatment vectors. We
follow this analysis with a corresponding analysis for data from multiple groups,
where there is no interference between groups. In such a setting, a full range of
treatment effects can be identified if the expected outcome of individual i again
depends on the fraction of others treated and, in addition, the outcome is a linear
function of this fraction.
Identification with Data from a Single Group
With Assumption 3.1 alone, it is possible to identify one particular average
treatment effect that is neither a direct nor an indirect effect. The identifiable
treatment effect is τ(1,Zk−1; 0,Zk), where Zk−1 and Zk denote sets of n−1 length
vectors in which k − 1 and k individuals are treated respectively.
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With outcomes from a single group this average treatment effect is estimated
by
τˆ = Ŷ (1)− Ŷ (0),
where Ŷ (t) ≡
∑n
i=1[Yi·I(Ti=t)]∑n
i=1 I(Ti=t)
for t ∈ {0, 1}.
Proposition 3.1: Under Assumption 3.1,
τ(1,Zk−1; 0,Zk)
is identified with data from n individuals in a single group. The estimator τˆ
provides an unbiased estimate of τ(1,Zk−1; 0,Zk).
Proof: Noting that τ(1,Zk−1; 0,Zk) ≡ 1n
∑n
i=1[E(Yi|Ti = 1, Z(i) ∈ Zk−1) −
E(Yi|Ti = 0, Z(i) ∈ Zk)], it is sufficient to show that E[Ŷ (1)] = 1n
∑n
i=1 E(Yi|Ti =
1, Z(i) ∈ Zk−1) and E[Ŷ (0)] = 1n
∑n
i=1 E(Yi|Ti = 0, Z(i) ∈ Zk). In order to establish
these facts, we note that Assumption 3.1 implies for all i: Pr(Z(i) = ω|Ti =
1, Z(i) ∈ Zk−1) =
(
(n−1)!
(n−k)!(k−1)!
)−1 ∀ω ∈ Zk−1 and Pr(Z(i) = ω|Ti = 0, Z(i) ∈ Zk) =(
(n−1)!
(n−1−k)!k!
)−1 ∀ω ∈ Zk.
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E[Ŷ (1)] = k−1
n∑
i=1
E[Yi · I(Ti = 1)]
= k−1
n∑
i=1
(
n!
(n− k)!k!
)−1 ∑
ω∈Zk−1
fi(1, ω)
= k−1
n∑
i=1
(
n
k
· (n− 1)!(n− k)!(k − 1)!
)−1 ∑
ω∈Zk−1
fi(1, ω)
= k−1
n∑
i=1
(
n
k
)−1
E(Yi|Ti = 1, Z(i) ∈ Zk−1)
= 1
n
n∑
i=1
E(Yi|Ti = 1, Z(i) ∈ Zk−1).
The first line uses the fact that ∑ni=1 I(Ti = 1) is equal to the fixed number
k. Assumption 3.1 makes it possible to go from the first to the second line.
The third line is an algebraic rearrangement of the second line, and fourth line
follows from the implication of Assumption 3.1. It can be similarly shown that
E[Ŷ (0)] = 1
n
∑n
i=1 E(Yi|Ti = 0, Z(i) ∈ Zk).
An Example
As a concrete example, consider a group of n = 4 individuals, k = 2 of whom
are to be selected for treatment. Under Assumption 3.1, each of the following
treatment vectors for the group has probability 16 of being implemented: (1, 1, 0, 0);
(1, 0, 1, 0); (1, 0, 0, 1); (0, 1, 1, 0); (0, 1, 0, 1); and (0, 0, 1, 1). Regardless of which
of the these six schemes is actually implemented, it is guaranteed that for any
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treated individual i, Z(i) ∈ Z1, and for any untreated individual j, Z(j) ∈ Z2.
This fact allows the researcher to identify τ(1,Z1; 0,Z2), as both its components
1
n
∑n
i=1 E(Yi|Ti = 1, Z(i) ∈ Z1) and 1n
∑n
i=1 E(Yi|Ti = 0, Z(i) ∈ Z2) are identifiable.
Effects corresponding to different numbers of others treated cannot be identified
under a research design with a single group of 4 individuals, 2 of whom are
treated. For example, τ(1,Z0; 0,Z3) cannot be identified as the researcher will
never observe a treated individual with Z(i) = (0, 0, 0) or an untreated individual
with Z(i) = (1, 1, 1).
Identifying A Direct Effect
The identified quantity τ(1,Zk−1; 0,Zk) is neither a direct nor an indirect
effect. However if we impose restrictions on the form of the conditional expectation
functions in (3.1), a direct effect can be identified in an arbitrarily large group.
Specifically, we restrict the conditional expectation function to depend only on
the fraction of other group members receiving treatment rather than on vectors
of others’ treatment statuses. The absolute number and identity of the other
treated or untreated group members do not matter in expectation. Furthermore,
we impose a continuity requirement on the conditional expectation functions.
These restrictions are formally stated in Assumption 3.2.
Assumption 3.2: Let ZC be the set of n − 1 length vectors in which P (C)
fraction of individuals are treated.
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E
[
Yi|Ti = t, Z(i) ∈ ZC
]
= gi(t, P (C)),
where ∀ i, the function gi is continuous in the fraction of others treated (i.e.
its second argument).
Assumption 3.2 is implicit in much empirical work on interference, which tends
to capture the effect of others’ treatment statuses through a single number (i.e.
fraction treated) rather than through vectors (Duflo and Saez, 2003; Ferracci et
al., 2010; Crepon et al., 2013). As the conditional expectations are reduced to
functions of only of own treatment and the fraction of others treated, it is possible
express to any average treatment effect as a function of the same. Let ZA and
ZB denote the sets of n − 1 length vectors in which P (A) and P (B) fractions of
individuals are treated, respectively. Under Assumption 3.2:
τ(t,ZA; t′,ZB) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
[gi(t, P (A))− gi(t′, P (B))] = τ(t, P (A); t′, P (B)), (3.2)
and the concepts of direct effects (t′ 6= t, P (A) = P (B)) and indirect effects
(t′ = t, P (A) 6= P (B)) apply.
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With Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 and an arbitrarily large group size, the direct
effect τ(1, k
n
; 0, k
n
) can be identified with data from n individuals in a single group.
This direct effect is consistently estimated by τˆ .
Corollary 3.1: Under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2,
τ(1, k
n
; 0, k
n
)
can be identified with data from a single group and τˆ is a consistent estimator of
τ(1, k
n
; 0, k
n
).
Proof: Given that τ(1, k
n
; 0, k
n
) ≡ 1
n
∑n
i=1[gi(1, kn)− gi(0, kn)], it is sufficient to
show that as n → ∞, E[Ŷ (1)] → 1
n
∑n
i=1 gi(1, kn) and E[Ŷ (0)] → 1n
∑n
i=1 gi(0, kn).
Proposition 3.1 implies E[Ŷ (1)] = 1
n
∑n
i=1 gi(1, k−1n−1). Because ∀ i the function
gi is continuous in its second argument, as n → ∞ (and the fraction of the
group treated remains constant), E[Ŷ (1)]→ 1
n
∑n
i=1 gi(1, kn). By similar reasoning,
E[Ŷ (0)]→ 1
n
∑n
i=1 gi(0, kn).
Corollary 3.1 leverages the fact that as the group size grows arbitrarily large
(and fraction of the group treated remains constant), the fraction of others receiv-
ing treatment converges to the fraction of the entire group receiving treatment.
For example, consider a group of individuals, one-half of whom are to be selected
for treatment. If n = 4, for an untreated individual, the fraction of others
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treated is 23 , while for a treated individual the fraction of others treated is
1
3 .
However, if n = 400, the corresponding fractions are 200399 and
199
399 , both of which
are approaching 12 . An implication of Corollary 3.1 for empirical research is that in
settings where group size is small, it is critical to distinguish between the fraction
of others receiving treatment and the fraction of all group members receiving
treatment. As we illustrate in Section 4, this issue becomes all the more important
when more than one group is observed.
Identification With Data from More than One Group
Now suppose that the researcher can observe two groups of n individuals each.9
In group 1, k1 individuals are selected for treatment according to Assumption 3.1,
while in group 2 k2 individuals are selected. If the fraction of individuals treated
in each group is not the same (i.e. k1 6= k2), it is possible to identify additional
forms of (3.2), provided a further assumption is made regarding how treatment is
assigned across groups. We refer to the fraction of individual’s treated in a group
as the group’s treatment regime.
Assumption 3.3: Consider a randomized experiment in which 2 groups of
n individuals are to be assigned to 2 treatment regimes, with one group assigned
9The groups do not necessarily have to contain the same number of individuals. However, if
they contain different number of individuals, it is necessary to weight the averages of observed
outcomes in order to estimate a quantity that is comparable to (3.1) or (3.2).
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to treatment regime 1 and the other group assigned to treatment regime 2. The
probability that a given group is subject to treatment regime 1 is 0.5.
Assumption 3.3 is the cross-group analogue of Assumption 3.1.10 While As-
sumption 3.1 pertains to the random assignment of treatment across individuals
within a group, Assumption 3.3 pertains to the random assignment of treatment
regimes across groups.
Proposition 3.2: Let Ŷ 1(1) and Ŷ 1(0) respectively be the average observed
outcome over the treated and untreated in group 1. Let Ŷ 2(1) and Ŷ 2(0) respec-
tively be the average observed outcome over the treated and untreated in group
2. Then, under Assumptions 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3
E[Ŷ 1(1)− Ŷ 1(0)] = τ(1, k1 − 1
n1 − 1; 0,
k1
n1 − 1),
E[Ŷ 2(1)− Ŷ 2(0)] = τ(1, k2 − 1
n2 − 1; 0,
k2
n2 − 1),
E[Ŷ 1(1)− Ŷ 2(0)] = τ(1, k1 − 1
n1 − 1; 0,
k2
n2 − 1),
E[Ŷ 2(1)− Ŷ 1(0)] = τ(1, k2 − 1
n2 − 1; 0,
k1
n1 − 1),
E[Ŷ 1(1)− Ŷ 2(1)] = τ(1, k1 − 1
n1 − 1; 1,
k2 − 1
n2 − 1),
10Assumption 3.3 can be generalized to the case where there are more than two groups assigned
to more than two treatment regimes.
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E[Ŷ 1(0)− Ŷ 2(0)] = τ(0, k1
n1 − 1; 0,
k2
n2 − 1).
where in general τ(t, P (A); t′, P (B)) = 12n
∑2n
i=1[gi(t, P (A)) − gi(t′, P (B))]. Even
if the group size is small, a direct effect can be identified if the researcher sets
k1−1
n1−1 =
k2
n2−1 or
k2−1
n2−1 =
k1
n1−1 . As discussed previously, if the group size is large, two
separate direct effects are identified by the within-group comparisions E[Ŷ 1(1)−
Ŷ 1(0)] and E[Ŷ 2(1)− Ŷ 2(0)]. (See Appendix C for proof of Proposition 3.2).
Finally, if one assumes linearity of the conditional expectation function, then
estimates from two or more groups can identify the full spectrum of population
average treatment effects. Let ZA denote the set of vectors in which P (A) fraction
are treated. Assuming linearity:
E
[
Yi|Ti, Z(i) ∈ ZA
]
= β0 + β1Ti + β2P (A) .
Alternatively, a more general functional form may be assumed, where the effect
of a change in the fraction of others treated is different for treated and untreated
individuals:
E
[
Yi|Ti, Z(i) ∈ ZA
]
= β0 + β1Ti + β2P (A) + β3Ti · P (A).
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3.4 Inference
Let Wi be the two-dimensional vector where the first element is the treatment
status of individual i and the second element is the fraction of other members of
i’s group who are treated. If the impact of these treatment indicators is linear
on the outcome, then a natural framework is
Yi = α + τ1Wi,1 + τ2Wi,2 + Ui. (3.3)
Assumptions 3.1 and 3.3 ensure the orthogonality of the regressors and the er-
ror term, Ui. The coefficient τ1 captures the impact of changing individual i’s
treatment status, while holding the treatment status of others (fraction treated)
constant. Hence τ1 measures the direct effect of treatment on the outcome and, as
discussed above, cannot be identified from the assignment of treatments to a single
group, as the individual’s own treatment status perfectly predicts the fraction of
others treated. The coefficient τ2 captures the impact of changing the fraction of
others treated, while leaving the treatment status of individual i unchanged, and
so captures an indirect effect. For similar reasons, this quantity also cannot be
identified from the assignment of treatments to a single group.
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If there are observations from multiple groups, and the treatment design
ensures variation across groups in the fraction of individuals treated, then OLS
estimators of the coefficients yield consistent estimates of both the direct and
indirect effects. One issue to consider, it is likely that the error is correlated
within groups, but not across groups, so estimates of precision should be based
on cluster-robust standard errors.
An Empirical Example
Duflo and Saez (2003) conduct a field experiment in which randomly selected
non-faculty employees in a university are incentivized to attend an information
fair on retirement plans. The outcome of interest is whether an employee attends
the fair, and the treatment is whether the employee is selected to receive a cash
prize as a reward for attendance. The authors are interested not only in the
effect of an employee’s own treatment but also in the effect of the treatments of
other employees in the same department. They argue that interference can occur
among employees in the same department but not among employees in different
departments. Their setting thus conforms to our framework.
Of the 330 departments in the university, 220 are selected for a treatment
regime in which half of the department’s employees are treated. In the remaining
110 departments, no employees are treated. Duflo and Saez use the following
regression model:
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E [fij|Lij, Dj] = γ0 + γ1Lij + γ2Dj, (3.4)
where fij is an indicator for whether employee i in department j attends the
fair. The variable Lij is an indicator for whether the employee is treated and Dj
is an indicator for whether the employee’s department was one among the 220
selected for treatment. If the treatments of others can be reduced to a fraction
and the department sizes are large, the parameter γ2 identifies an indirect effect
τ(0, 0.5; 0, 0), while γ1 identifies a direct effect τ(1, 0.5; 0, 0.5).11
Consequences of Incorrect Specification with Small Group Sizes
Regression equation (3.4) differs from (3.3) in an important way. Instead of
including as a regressor the fraction of others treated in i’s department, Duflo and
Saez (2003) instead include the fraction of all individuals treated in i’s department
(including i).12 As discussed in Section 3, if the number of individuals in a group
(i.e. department) is large, this should not matter.13 However, if group sizes are
small, the distinction between the fraction of others receiving treatment, and the
fraction of all group members receiving treatment, is critical. We demonstrate
11Duflo and Saez construe Dj to be dichotomous rather than continuously varying. If they
instead interpreted it as continuously varying, a further range of effects could be identfied. For
example, τ(1, P (A); 1, P (B)) would be identified by γ2 ∗ [P (A)− P (B)].
12This is a common practice in empirical research. See also Ferracci et al. (2010) and Crepon
et al. (2013).
13The median number of individuals in a department is 15 (Duflo and Saez, 2003).
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by simulation that replacing the former with the latter can provide misleading
estimates not just of the indirect effect (τ2) but also the direct effect (τ1).
The data generating process is specified by (3.3) and the error term Ui is
modeled as a standard normal distribution. In the first set of simulations, the
parameter values are set as follows: α = 20, τ1 = 20, and τ2 = 20. An individual’s
expected outcome is higher by 20 units if assigned to treatment and the individual
benefits further as the fraction of others treated increases. We generate 1000
datasets, each consisting of 24 groups of 5 individuals each (120 individuals). The
fraction of individuals treated within a group can take on one of six values: 0, 15 ,
2
5 ,
3
5 ,
4
5 , or 1, with 4 groups subject to each treatment regime.
From each of the 1000 simulated datasets, we estimate the coefficients using
the specification
Yi = α + τ1Wi,1 + τ2W˜i,2 + Ui, (3.5)
where W˜i,2 denotes the fraction of all members of i’s group (including i) who
are treated.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 depict histograms of the 1000 estimates of the direct
effect (τ1) and the indirect effect (τ2), respectively. The true values of both these
parameters is 20, however the estimates of τ1 are centered around 15, while the
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estimates of τ2 are centered around 25. If an individual is treated, replacing Wi,2
with W˜i,2 understates the fraction of others treated. On the other hand, if an
individual is untreated, replacing Wi,2 with W˜i,2 overstates the fraction of others
treated. As a result, some of the true direct effect is attributed to the effect of
others’ treatments and the estimate of τ1 is systematically lower than its true
value. It is also seen that the estimate of τ2 is systematically higher than its true
value.
The bias in the direct effect estimates becomes even more serious if indirect
effects play a larger role in determining an individual’s outcome. In the second
set of simulations the parameter values are set as follows: α = 20, τ1 = 20, and
τ2 = 100. The marginal positive effect of a change in the fraction of others treated
is five times larger than in the first set of simulations. We again generate 1000
datasets, each consisting of 24 groups of 5 individuals each (120 individuals). The
fraction of individuals treated within a group can take on one of six values: 0, 15 ,
2
5 ,
3
5 ,
4
5 , or 1, with 4 groups subject to each treatment regime. From each of the
1000 simulated datasets, we estimate the coefficients using (3.5).
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 depict histograms of the 1000 estimates of the direct effect
(τ1) and the indirect effect (τ2), respectively, from the second set of simulations.
The true value of τ2 is 100, but the estimates are centered around 125. What
is more striking, however, is the egregious downward bias of the direct effect
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estimates. The direct effect estimates, which are centered around -5, do not even
have the same sign as the true direct effect. These simulations highlight the
importance of carefully specifying the treatment of others, especially when group
sizes are small.
3.5 Conclusion
The contributions of this paper are two-fold. First, we extend the framework
of potential outcomes to situations characterized by interference. This extension
gives rise to a wide range of population average treatment effects, including direct
effects (due to a change only in an individual’s own treatment status) and indirect
effects (due to a change only in the treatment status of others). Our second
contribution is in the estimation of population average treatment effects. We
propose conditions under which a linear regression can be used to estimate the
full range of treatment effects. The importance of correctly specifying the linear
regression is demonstrated through simulations.
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Figure 3.1: Histogram of Simulated Estimates of Direct Effect (τ1): Actual
Values α = 20, τ1 = 20, τ2 = 20
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Figure 3.2: Histogram of Simulated Estimates of Indirect Effect (τ2): Actual
Values α = 20, τ1 = 20, τ2 = 20
Figure 3.3: Histogram of Simulated Estimates of Direct Effect (τ1): Actual
Values α = 20, τ1 = 20, τ2 = 100
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Figure 3.4: Histogram of Simulated Estimates of Indirect Effect (τ2): Actual
Values α = 20, τ1 = 20, τ2 = 100
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Additional Proofs in Chapter 1
Proposition A1: The number of lobbying firms in equilibrium, k, is uniquely
determined.
Proof: Suppose there exists a Nash equilibrium with k lobbying firms and
another Nash equilibrium with k′ lobbying firms. Without loss of generality,
suppose k′ > k. The equilibrium conditions stipulate
ωi <
1
k−1
∑k
j=1 ωj for i = 1, 2, ..., k
ωi ≥ 1k−1
∑k
j=1 ωj for i = k + 1, k + 2, ..., n
(A.1)
and
ωi <
1
k′−1
∑k
j=1 ωj for i = 1, 2, ..., k′
ωi ≥ 1k′−1
∑k
j=1 ωj for i = k′ + 1, k′ + 2, ..., n
(A.2)
where i indexes firms in order of lobbying cost (i.e. firm 1 is the firm with lowest
lobbying cost; firm n is the firm with the highest lobbying cost).
Condition (A.2) implies (k′ − 1)ωk′ < ∑k′j=1 ωj, which can be equivalently
expressed as (k−1)ωk′+(k′−k)ωk′ < ∑kj=1 ωj+∑k′j=k+1 ωj. Condition (A.1) implies
(k−1)ωk′ > ∑kj=1 ωj, therefore it must be that (k′−k)ωk′ < ∑k′j=k+1 ωj. However,
because ∀ j < k′, ωj < ωk′ , ωk′ > 1k′−k
∑k′
j=k+1 ωj, which implies (k′ − k)ωk′ >∑k′
j=k+1 ωj leading to a contradiction. Therefore there cannot exist two Nash
equilibria with different numbers of lobbying firms. Q.E.D.
Proposition A2: The equilibrium lobbying effort of a lobbying firm is de-
creasing in the firm’s own cost of lobbying. The effect of an increase in another
firm’s lobbying costs is ambiguous.
Proof: For a lobbying firm i, xi = τφ(k−1)(∑k
j=1 ωj)
2 ·
((∑k
j=1 ωj
)
− ωi(k − 1)
)
.
Differentiating xi with respect to ωi yields
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∂xi
∂ωi
= τφ(k − 1)
2(k − 1)ωi
∑k
j=1 ωj − k
(∑k
j=1 ωj
)2
(∑k
j=1 ωj
)4
 , (A.3)
which is strictly negative if and only if 2ωi
k
< 1
k−1
∑k
j=1 ωj. Because k ≥ 2, 2ωik ≤ ωi.
The condition for a lobbying firm i is that ωi < 1k−1
∑k
j=1 ωj. Together these imply
2ωi
k
< 1
k−1
∑k
j=1 ωj.
Differentiating xi with respect to ωi′ (with i′ 6= i) yields
∂xi
∂ωi′
= τφ(k − 1)
2(k − 1)ωi −∑kj=1 ωj(∑k
j=1 ωj
)3
 . (A.4)
The denominator is obviously positive. Because ωi may be greater or less than
1
2(k−1)
∑k
j=1 ωj, the sign of ∂xi∂ωi′ is ambiguous. Q.E.D.
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Table B.1: Regressions with Number of Connected MPs (Unweighted)
Dependent Variable: Ln(Final Allocation) (1) (2) (3)
Ln(Provisional Allocation)
0.937∗∗∗
(0.042)
0.922∗∗∗
(0.057)
0.965∗∗∗
(0.042)
Number of MPs
0.016
(0.032)
0.008
(0.049)
-0.059
(0.056)
(Number of MPs)ˆ2
-0.00005
(0.0014)
-0.00001
(0.0021)
0.0025
(0.0024)
ln(Total Fixed Assets)
0.015
(0.042)
ln(Employees)
0.030
(0.083)
Profit Margin
0.536
(0.427)
Industry Controls? No Yes Yes
Weighted Regression? No No No
N 247 247 185
R2 0.84 0.86 0.90
Excludes universities, hospitals, and other government entities. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are clustered by industry. The superscripts ***, **, and * denote
significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively.
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Table B.2: Regressions with Number of Connected MPs (Weighted, Levels)
Dependent Variable: Final Allocation (1) (2) (3)
Provisional Allocation
0.956∗∗∗
(0.021)
0.979∗∗∗
(0.029)
0.989∗∗∗
(0.009)
Number of MPs
298,565∗∗∗
(30,128)
247,243∗∗∗
(19,489)
267,234∗∗∗
(38,322)
(Number of MPs)ˆ2
-10,004∗∗∗
(2,099)
-8,519∗∗∗
(1,151)
-8,957∗∗∗
(1,877)
ln(Total Fixed Assets)
128,232∗
(58,952)
ln(Employees)
-163,150
(107,381)
Profit Margin
3,638
(8,000)
Industry Controls? No Yes Yes
Weighted Regression? Yes Yes Yes
N 247 247 185
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99
Excludes universities, hospitals, and other government entities. Observations
weighted by provisional allocation. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
by industry. The superscripts ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10
percent levels respectively.
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Table B.3: Regressions with Number of Connected MPs (Unweighted, Levels)
Dependent Variable: Final Allocation (1) (2) (3)
Provisional Allocation
0.966∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.967∗∗∗
(0.016)
0.987∗∗∗
(0.016)
Number of MPs
58,883
(60,227)
60,930
(55,544)
68,527
(69,390)
(Number of MPs)ˆ2
-1,199
(2,883)
-1,632
(2,767)
-1,693
(2,998)
ln(Total Fixed Assets)
27,156
(26,945)
ln(Employees)
-28,774
(39,720)
Profit Margin
-948
(2,161)
Industry Controls? No Yes Yes
Weighted Regression? No No No
N 247 247 185
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99
Excludes universities, hospitals, and other government entities. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are clustered by industry. The superscripts ***, **, and * denote
significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively.
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Additional Proofs in Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 3.2: We demonstrate the unbiasedness of E[Ŷ 1(1)−
Ŷ 2(1)] = τ(1, k1−1
n1−1 ; 1,
k2−1
n2−1). The same reasoning can be used to establish the
unbiasedness of the other 5 inter-group comparisions listed in Proposition 3.2.
Let the Sj indicate the treatment regime of group j, where Sj = 1 if group
j receives treatment regime 1 (corresponding to k1
n
fraction treated) and zero
otherwise. Let Yij denote the observed outcome of individual i in group j. Note
that
Yˆ 1(1) =
2∑
j=1
(∑n
i=1[Yij · I(Tij = 1)]∑n
i=1 I(Tij = 1)
· I(Sj = 1)
)
and
Yˆ 2(1) =
2∑
j=1
(∑n
i=1[Yij · I(Tij = 1)]∑n
i=1 I(Tij = 1)
· I(Sj = 0)
)
.
It is sufficient to show that
E[Ŷ 1(1)] = 12n
2n∑
i=1
gi(1,
k1 − 1
n1 − 1)
and
E[Ŷ 2(1)] = 12n
2n∑
i=1
gi(1,
k2 − 1
n2 − 1).
113
Appendix C. Additional Proofs in Chapter 3
E[Ŷ 1(1)] =
2∑
j=1
E
[∑n
i=1[Yij · I(Tij = 1)]∑n
i=1 I(Tij = 1)
· I(Sj = 1)
]
(C.1)
=
2∑
j=1
E
(
E
[∑n
i=1[Yij · I(Tij = 1)]∑n
i=1 I(Tij = 1)
· I(Sj = 1)
]
|Sj
)
=
2∑
j=1
(
1
2 ·
1
n
n∑
i=1
gij(1,
k − 1
n− 1)
)
= 12n
2n∑
i=1
gi(1,
k1 − 1
n1 − 1).
The second line is obtained by applying the law of iterated expectations to the
first line. The third line follows from the second line, along with Corollary 3.1
and Assumption 3.3. Specifically, note that
(
E
[∑n
i=1[Yij ·I(Tij=1)]∑n
i=1 I(Tij=1)
· I(Sj = 1)
]
|Sj
)
= 0 if Sj = 01
n
∑n
i=1 gij(1, k−1n−1) if Sj = 1
,
(C.2)
with the probability Sj = 0 being 12 .
It can be similarly shown that E[Ŷ 2(1)] = 12n
∑2n
i=1 gi(1, k2−1n2−1).
114
